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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Calm Air International LP conducted a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) during the summer and fall of 2014. LOSA is a
proactive safety effort which places trained and calibrated observers in cockpit jumpseats during normal flying operations to
capture safety-targeted data about how Flight Crews manage the complexities that occur during their flights.
A Steering Committee made up of Calm Air management and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) representatives oversaw the
project throughout its entirety, which began in April 2014 with the first Steering Committee meeting and completed in May
2015 with the publication of this report.
Volunteer Observers were selected from line pilot ranks and were trained and calibrated for their duties with support from a
third party. A data collection tool was used to capture threat and error management (TEM) variables, along with flight
narratives. A sample of flights was identified in order to capture the range of destinations, environments and aircraft types
operated by the airline. The decision to allow a LOSA Observer into the flight deck was at the discretion of the Captain – all
data was captured voluntarily and logged in a secure online database.
A total of 83 flight sectors were observed during the observation period, capturing 184 threats, 248 errors and 23 undesired
aircraft states. Observes also conducted a brief questionnaire with flight crews about their thoughts related to specific
aspects of the operation.

Table 1: LOSA TEM Summary
Total Count

Mean
(83 Sectors)

Standard
Deviation

Threats

184

2.22

1.601

Errors

248

2.99

2.516

UAS

23

0.28

0.502

Trends in the data identified opportunities for improvement with visual approach briefings and other standard operating
procedure (SOP) ambiguities as well as vulnerabilities in checklist and briefing practices. Intentional noncompliance was noted
in areas commonly identified in industry LOSAs. Unstable approaches were logged at a rate consistent with industry
averages, through no go-arounds were initiated as a result of an unstable approach (all were flown to a landing). Opportunities
to improve working relationships with other organizational departments were identified, the System Operations Coordination
Centre (SOCC) and Maintenance in particular.
The LOSA, though a logistically challenging effort, was seen to be an investment in Flight Operations - a proactive diagnostic
safety tool to identify strengths and weaknesses within the operation. Many Pilots expressed support for the LOSA process,
along with their anticipation and expectation that findings will lead to improvement and progress. A list of high-level
recommendations is offered based on LOSA findings as a guide for future action.
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GLOSSARY
A/C

Aircraft

ACM

Air Cycle Machine, often referred to as an ‘ACM Pack’. Used for air conditioning.

ADU

Advisory Display Unit (ATR)

AGL

Above Ground Level

ALPA

Air Line Pilots Association

APM

Aircraft Performance Monitor; ATR system that monitors for performance degradation
(ice accumulation)

APU

Auxiliary Power Unit

ASL

Above Sea Level

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATIS

Automated Terminal Information Service

CAP

Canada Air Pilot

CARs

Canadian Aviation Regulations

CARS

Community Aerodrome Radio Station

CofG

Centre of Gravity

CRFI

Canadian Runway Friction Index

CRM

Crew Resource Management

CSA

Customer Service Agent

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FL

Flight Level

FMC

Flight Management Computer

FMC/FMGC

Flight Management Computer/Flight Management Guidance Computer (LOSA coding)

FMS

Flight Management System

FSS

Flight Service Station

GPU

Ground Power Unit

HDG

Heading (Heading Mode – Flight Director)

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

GPWS

Ground Proximity Warning System

Master Caution

Visual and Aural Alert to Crew; requires immediate attention but delayed action

Master Warning

Visual and Aural Alert to Crew; required immediate attention and immediate action

MCP

Mode Control Panel

MCP/FCU

Mode Control Panel/Flight Control Unit (LOSA coding)

NAV

Navigation (Navigation Mode – Flight Director)

NDB

Non-Directional Beacon

NM

Nautical Mile

NOTOC

Notification to Captain; designated document for informing crew of Dangerous Goods carried onboard.

OFP

Operational Flight Plan
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PAPI

Precision Approach Path Indicator

PF

Pilot Flying

PNF

Pilot Not Flying

QRH

Quick Reference Handbook

RNAV

Area Navigation; often referred to in context of GPS-based navigation

SID

Standard Instrument Departure Procedure

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

TCAS

Traffic Collision Avoidance System

TEM

Threat and Error Management

TOD

Top of Descent

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions
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INTRODUCTION
LINE OPERATIONS SAFETY AUDIT (LOSA)
This report details the process and findings related to a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) conducted at Calm Air during the
summer and fall of 2014.
Traditionally, improvements in aviation safety have been the result of a reactive approach. The lessons learned from aircraft
accident data have contributed to changes in regulations, technology, training and standard operating procedures, though at
great cost. A limitation of the accident investigation is that it focuses on failure; we have to wait for an accident to occur, and
then we can learn about how the crew handled the situation. What we do not learn from the accident though is how other
crews have successfully managed a similar situation (ICAO, 2002).
Among the contemporary tools of aviation safety management that includes safety reporting and flight data monitoring (FDM)
programs is the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). The Human Factors Research Project at the University of Texas
received FAA funding to develop LOSA in the early 1990s as a research effort to assess the transfer of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) training from the classroom to the flight line (ICAO, 2002). LOSA places expert observers in flight deck
jumpseats on routine line flight and uses the Threat and Error Management (TEM) model as a framework to collect and
categorize crew performance data. This data can be used proactively to provide “a diagnostic snapshot of organizational
performance [and also provide] a data-driven mechanism for measuring change (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003,
p.2) that has the potential to impact nearly all departments in the airline by helping to:


Identify threats in the airline’s operating environment



Identify threats in the airline’s operating operations



Assess the degree of transference of training to the line



Check the quality and usability of procedures;



Identify design problems in the human-machine interface



Understand pilots’ shortcuts and workarounds;



Assess safety margins;



Provide a baseline for organizational change; and



Provide a rationale for the allocation of resources. (FAA, 2006, p.3)

A useful analogy for understanding the premise of LOSA is offered by the original developers:

“In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting your cholesterol checked during a routine
examination. The test, usually performed as a preventive measure, provides evidence of risk on having a
heart attack or other serious health event. The results themselves do not provide a solution but can prompt
a person to make healthier lifestyle choices. A person might also choose to do nothing and carry on as
normal. Either way, the person learned something and is responsible for change. LOSA is the same. It
provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety performance. It uses cockpit observations collected in normal
operations to provide a profile of safety strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on the airline to
respond to the data and make change if necessary, in order to prevent an incident or accident.” (Klinect et
al., 2003, p.2)
While LOSA may be more widely associated as a safety tool used by larger airlines such as Continental Airlines, Alaska
Airlines, Cathay Pacific Airways, and Air Canada, its application has been successfully demonstrated in a regional airline
setting (Eames-Brown, 2007). The original developers of LOSA identify 10 key operating characteristics of which, if employed,
make it a tool that can be applied in most flight operations.
Discussion about conducting a LOSA at Calm Air began in mid-2013 as a tool to help collect meaningful operational safety
data within the company’s Safety Management System. To this point, the system had relied heavily on employee-submitted
incident/hazard reports and proactive suggestions for improvement to assess organizational safety performance – these
sources are valuable and essential, though they have limitations.
LOSA was seen as an opportunity to document and assess the defences and vulnerabilities of the airline through the
experience of the flight crews. By conducting the process in a methodical and disciplined way, the outcome was seen as a
valid data set of typical Calm Air flights that were representative of daily flight operations, which had credibility with both
airline management and line pilots alike, and from which data-driven improvements could be made.
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CALM AIR INTERNATIONAL LP
Calm Air is an independent regional airline that primarily serves the communities of northern Manitoba and the Kivalliq region
of Nunavut. The company operates ATR42, ATR72, D328JET and Hawker HS748 aircraft in accordance with Canadian
Aviation Regulations (CARs) Subpart 705 operations and
Figure A: Calm Air System Map
has main bases in Winnipeg, MB and Thompson, MB,
employing nearly 500 people. Calm Air had been owned
and operated by its founders until 2009 when it was
acquired by the Exchange Income Corporation. The parent
company also owns several other Canadian air operators.
The airline conducts passenger operations as well as allcargo freighter flights. Many aircraft in the ATR 42/72
fleet can be set to a ‘combi’ configuration to carry large
amounts of cargo on scheduled passenger flights.
Freighter operations are normally staged out of Thompson
or Churchill, MB where the company maintains
warehouse facilities. ATR freighter aircraft can also be
configured to carry bulk fuel in an integral tank system to
re-supply remote communities.
A breakdown of the Calm Air fleet at the time of the
LOSA is found below. Since being acquired by the
Exchange Income Corporation, the flight operation has
undergone a fleet renewal program that has seen the
retirement of the Saab 340 fleet and all but one of the
HS748 fleet and their replacement with ATR42/72 and
Dornier 328JET aircraft.
With the exception of the HS748, all aircraft are equipped
with flight management systems (FMS); the ATR42/72
use the Universal UNS-1K or UNS-1Lw and the D328JET
fleet use the Honeywell FMZ series. At the time of the
LOSA, only the D328JET fleet was authorized to conduct
non-precision RNAV approach procedures.

Pilot Group
Table 2: Calm Air Fleet

At the time of the LOSA, there were 90 pilots listed on
the Pilot Seniority List, including 4 Management Pilots
(V.P. Operation, Director, Flight Operations, Chief Pilot and
Assistant Chief Pilot). The pilot group is represented by the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA).

Aircraft Type
ATR42
ATR72
D328JET
HS748

No. in Fleet
7
4
2
1

Total

15

In Service Since
2007
2010
2012
1981

-

Generally speaking, new-hire pilots come to the organization from
Air Taxi (CAR 703) and (Commuter (CAR 704) flight operations. Pilots conduct initial and annual flight training in full flight
simulators (ATR42/72 and D328JET), including Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). Annually, they also conduct two days of
annual aircraft type training and two days of annual company training in the classroom including Crew Resource Management
(CRM), supplemented with online learning.

While the organization sees flight crew turnover at along the natural rate in the industry, nearly 70% of line pilots had at least
5 years of service at the time of the LOSA. Internal research conducted in 2013 showed that the average age of a Calm Air
pilot was 36 years old (SD=8.07) and that the average length of service with the company was 6.9 years (SD=4.73) (Mitchell,
2013).
Table 3: Pilot Aircraft Qualification and Workload (2014)
Aircraft
Qualification
ATR42/72
D328JET
HS748
MGMT

Total

6
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No. of Pilots
65
17
4
4

90

Average Hours
Flown/Year (2014)
635.9
592.2
611.6
105.8

-

Average Days
Worked (2014)
178.4
176.3
183.3
-

-

Flight Attendants are assigned to duty as crewmembers on passenger-carrying flights. Cabin crew complement for the
D328JET, the ATR42, and the ATR72 (when in combi configuration) is one; two Flight Attendants are assigned to ATR72
flights when configured to full passenger configuration.
Flight Operations are conducted under a Type ‘B’ co-authority operational control system. Flight Dispatch is conducted from
the System Operations Coordination Centre in Winnipeg, and is staffed whenever flight operations are being conducted.
Figure B: Calm Air Fleet Images
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LOSA METHODOLOGY
THE CALM AIR LOSA
The decision to move forward with the LOSA was made collaboratively in March, 2014 in a meeting between members Calm
Air flight operations management and pilot association leadership. Both groups agreed with the value of the project and a fiveperson LOSA Steering Committee was formed which included two members of flight operations management (Director,
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot), two line pilots nominated by ALPA (One Captain, one First Officer) and a project manager.

LOSA Steering Committee
The Steering Committee met to lay out the scope and timeline of the project, communicate LOSA to the organization (see
Appendix B for communications sent to flight crews), identify solutions to expected challenges, and assemble a group of
volunteer observers. Line pilots were invited in June to volunteer to participate as observers by forwarding their name to one
of the ALPA representatives on the Steering Committee. Observers were selected by the Steering Committee; the
committee first made a list of attributes that they felt were important in credible and capable observer group, and then the
ALPA representative shared the list of names. In order to minimize bias and enhance credibility, management pilots would be
excluded from conducting observations and use of check/training pilots would be minimized if possible. Unanimous
agreement within the group was achieved and nine observers were selected.

Observer Training and Calibration
Many airlines contract out certain aspects of their LOSA while others conduct all aspects internally. Calm Air chose to conduct
the LOSA internally with the exception of Observer training, which was conducted in July by Dr. Robert Baron of The Aviation
Consulting Group. The four-day course covered all aspects of a LOSA with particular emphasis on Crew Resource
Management (CRM), Threat and Error Management (TEM), data collection and calibration. A data collection instrument was
finalized at this time (see Appendix A).

Dataset
Observations began the first week of August with the expectation of a two-month observation period and a goal of 80 unique
observations as a sample of flying throughout the Calm Air network (aircraft type and route). While a larger sample size would
have been desirable, this number was accepted as a compromise between what was required for a reasonable dataset and
the resources that could be allocated to the project (observers were all active Calm Air line pilots).
A subscription to an off-site, LOSA-specific database was purchased for data submission. Observers were issued hard-copy
worksheets for note taking in the cockpit as well as Microsoft Surface tablets to enter the data electronically to the online
database.

Observation Flight Assignment
The assignment of observation flights was semi-randomized. A list of desired routes was identified, along with a breakdown
of sectors by aircraft type which was proportional to the number of hours flown annually by each type. Observers bid specific
days in their schedule as a part of their normal bidding process (~4 days per month) and were then assigned sectors to
observe on those days by the Project Manager that would reflect normal operations within the organization (i.e.; arctic
operations, freighter operations, etc.) and were not limited to the type of aircraft that they normally flew. The observation
schedule was not made known to the line crews; the Observer would report for duty at the same time as the operating crew
and approach the Captain about conducting a LOSA observation. Flight crews were aware that LOSA was entirely voluntary
and that there were no repercussions if they elected not to participate. If a Captain decided to refuse an observation for any
reason, they would communicate it back in confidence to the Project Manager, who would then ensure that future planned
observation sectors would not target the same Captain. Due to factors that included weather-related flight cancellations,
illness, and recall to flying duties, the observation period was extended into early October in order to meet the sample size
goal.

Data Verification Roundtables
Two data verification roundtables were conducted by the Steering Committee over 5 days in late October and November.
Each observation was reviewed for accuracy and consistency. In some cases, similar events were found to be coded
differently by different observers and were corrected to a consisted code. In other cases, events were logged as ‘errors’
where there was no existing guidance or standard in company documentation. These were recorded in a separate file outside
of the LOSA as opportunities for improvement and were then removed from the LOSA dataset.

8
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THE THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT MODEL (TEM)
The framework of LOSA is based on the University of Texas Threat and Error Management model. This section discusses
TEM, and its application within LOSA. The definitions used in this section have been taken directly from ICAO Doc 8309, Line
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) where a more detailed discussion can be found.
TEM proposes that threats (such as adverse weather), errors (such as a pilot selecting a wrong automation mode), and
undesired aircraft states (such as an altitude deviation) are everyday events that flight crews must manage to maintain safety.
Therefore, flight crews that successfully manage these events regardless of occurrence are assumed to increase their
potential for maintaining adequate safety margins. It is this notion that provides the overarching objective of TEM—to provide
the best possible support for flight crews in managing threats, errors, and undesired aircraft states (Merritt & Klinect, 2006).
Figure C: Threat and Error Management Model

Threats
Threats are external situations that must be managed by the cockpit crew during normal, everyday flights. Such events
increase the operational complexity of the flight and pose a safety risk to the flight at some level.
Threats may be expected or anticipated and, therefore, the crew may brief in advance. Threats may also be unexpected. As
they occur suddenly and without any warning, there is no possibility for the crew to brief in advance. External threats may be
relatively minor or major.
Errors originated by non-cockpit personnel are considered external threats. For example, if the cockpit crew detects a fuel
loading error made by ground staff, it would be entered as an external threat, not an error. The crew was not the source of
the error (although they must manage it, as they would any other external threat). Other examples of non-cockpit crew errors
that would be entered as external threats are errors in Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearances discovered by the crew, dispatch
paperwork errors and discrepancies in passenger boarding counts by cabin attendants.
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Table 4: LOSA Threat Categories
Environmental Threats

Examples

Weather

Icing conditions, Thunderstorms, Crosswinds, Windshear

Airport

Airport construction, Contaminated runways, out-of-service navaids

ATC
Environmental
Operational Pressure

Challenging/Late clearances, Runway change, Non-standard phraseology

Airline Threats

Examples

Aircraft Malfunction
Airline Operational Pressure
Cabin/Cockpit

Traffic (air/ground congestion), TCAS alert, High terrain

Aircraft malfunction unexpected by crew, MEL items with operational
implications, Automation events
Operational time pressure (delays, OTP, late arriving crew or aircraft)
Cabin event/distraction/interruption, Flight Attendant error, significant cockpit
distraction/interruption

Dispatch/Paperwork

Dispatch/Paperwork error or event

Ground/Ramp

Ground/Ramp error or event

Ground Maintenance

Ground Maintenance error or event

Manuals/Charts

Errors associated with Approach Charts or Manuals

Errors
Cockpit crew error is defined as an action or inaction by the crew that leads to deviations from organizational or flight crew
intentions or expectations. Errors in the operational context tend to reduce the margin of safety and increase the probability of
accidents or incidents. Errors may be defined in terms of non-compliance with regulations, Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) and policies, or unexpected deviation from crew, company or ATC expectations. Errors observed may be minor
(selecting the wrong altitude into the mode control panel (MCP), but correcting it quickly) or major (forgetting to do an
essential checklist).

Table 5: LOSA Error Categories
Aircraft Handling Errors

Examples

Automation

Failure to use flight directors, Wrong altitude entered

Flight Control

Decision to use wrong thrust/power, Wrong flaps setting

Ground Navigation

Attempting/turning down wrong taxiway, Failure to hold short

Manual Handling

Unintentional vertical deviation, Speed deviation by choice
Wrong altimeter settings, Wrong TCAS setting, Using equipment placarded as
INOP

Systems/Instrument/Radio
Procedural Errors

Examples

Briefing

Omitted approach briefing, Brief performed late

Callout

Incorrect approach callouts, Nonstandard landing callouts

PF/PNF

Checklist not performed to completion, Self-initiated checklist (not called for by
CA)
PF makes own automation mode changes, PNF carries out PF duties

SOP Cross Verification

Failure to cross-verify altimeter settings, Failure to clarify MEL or logbook entry

Other Procedural

Duties performed at inappropriate time, Pushback without clearing left or right

Communication Errors

Examples

Checklist

Pilot to Pilot
Crew to External

10
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Crew miscommunication of information, Misinterpretation of ATIS, Sterile cockpit
violation
Use of nonstandard ATC phraseology, failure to give readback to ATC

LOSA considers three possible responses by crews to errors:
1.

Trap: An active flight crew response in which an error is detected and managed to an inconsequential outcome;

2.

Exacerbate: A flight crew response in which an error is detected but the crew action or inaction allows it to induce
an additional error, Undesired Aircraft State, incident or accident; and

3.

Fail to respond: The lack of a flight crew response to an error because it was either ignored or undetected.

The outcome of the error is dependent upon the flight crew response. LOSA considers three possible outcomes of errors
depending upon crew response:
1.

Inconsequential: An outcome that indicates the alleviation of risk that was previously caused by an error;

2.

Undesired Aircraft State: An outcome in which the aircraft is unnecessarily placed in a compromising situation that
poses an increased risk to safety; and

3.

Additional Error: An outcome that was the result of or is closely linked to a previous error.

Undesired Aircraft States (UAS)
An “Undesired Aircraft State” occurs when the flight crew places the aircraft in a situation of unnecessary risk. For instance,
an altitude deviation is an Undesired Aircraft State that presents unnecessary risk. An Undesired Aircraft State may occur in
response to a crew action or inaction (error). It is important to distinguish between errors and the Undesired Aircraft State that
can result. If an Undesired Aircraft State is observed, there should always be a crew error that is responsible for this
undesired state. Such errors may be miscommunications, lack of proficiency, poor decision making or wilful violation of
regulations.

Table 6: LOSA UAS Categories
Undesired Aircraft States

Examples

Aircraft Handling

Low speed deviation, Unnecessary weather penetration, Unstable approach

Ground Navigation

Runway incursion, Wrong taxiway

Incorrect A/C Configuration

Incorrect systems/instrument/radio configuration, incorrect engine configuration

LOSA considers three possible crew responses to Undesired Aircraft States:
1.

Mitigate: An active flight crew response to an Undesired Aircraft State that results in the alleviation of risk by
returning from the Undesired Aircraft State to safe flight;

2.

Exacerbate: A flight crew response in which an Undesired Aircraft State is detected, but the flight crew action or
inaction allows it to induce an additional error, incident or accident; and

3.

Fail to respond: The lack of an active flight crew response to an Undesired Aircraft State because it was ignored or
undetected.

LOSA considers three possible outcomes to Undesired Aircraft States:
1.

Recovery: An outcome that indicates the alleviation of risk that was previously caused by an Undesired Aircraft
State;

2.

End State/Incident/Accident: Any undesired ending that completes the activity sequence with a negative, terminal
outcome. These outcomes may be of little consequence, for example, a long landing or a landing too far to the left or
right of the centreline, or may result in a reportable incident or in an accident; and

3.

Additional error: The flight crew action or inaction that results in or is closely linked to another cockpit crew error.
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LOSA SAMPLE
The LOSA sampled 83 flight sectors during the 10-week
observation period, representing approximately 2% of the total
sectors flown by the company in that period.
Eight Observers collected data, completing on average 10.3
observations each with no member of the group completing fewer
than 8. Sampling succeeded in capturing a number of sectors for
each aircraft type which was proportional to the total number of
flight hours flown by that type annually. Due to the number of flight
crew operating the HS748 and the limited future of the aircraft in
the fleet, the decision was made to not observe flights on this
aircraft type for the LOSA.
Sectors were sampled throughout the Calm Air network and
included passenger flying, all-cargo freighter flights, as well as
several charter flights flying in and out of 16 airports. Flight duration
ranged from 0:10 to 3:29 with an average of 1:13 (SD=40 mins). A
late departure was noted if the aircraft taxied from the gate more
than 10 minutes past the scheduled departure time.
Efforts were made by the Steering Committee to see that sectors
which were known to be specifically sensitive to flight crews (i.e.;
freighter flights to destinations in northwest Ontario and high-arctic
Nunavut) were sampled, however after several failed attempts due
to weather and operational changes this became logistically
impractical to complete by the end of the observation period. A map
of the observed sectors, along with the frequency of the aircraft
types observed can be found on the following page.
Flight crews were surveyed for basic demographic data at the end
of the observation. On average, Captains had twice as much
experience as First Officers, both in total flying time and total flight
time on the aircraft type.
Descent and approach information was also captured for each
sector. In slightly more than half of the observations, the crew
conducted the approach briefing before the top of descent (TOD).
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) on approach were dominant
within the sample. Accordingly, a visual approach was the most
frequently observed type of approach.
While autopilot disconnect altitudes were not generally recorded by
observers, 87% of approaches were flown with the autopilot
engaged.

Table 7: Sample Descriptives
Aircraft Type
ATR42
D328
ATR72
HS748

Total

Late Departure
Yes
No

Total

Pilot Flying
Captain
First Officer

Total

Crew Familiarity
CAPT/FO Had Flown Together Before
CAPT/FO Had Not Flown Together
Before

Total

Frequency
46 (55.4%)
37 (44.6%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
46 (55.4%)
37 (44.6%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
73 (88.0%)
10 (12.0%)

83 (100.0%)
Average (Hrs)
10,798
2,108

FO Experience
Total Flight Time
Flight Time on Type

Average (Hrs)
5,475
1,106

Briefing Complete Before TOD
Yes
No

Total

Descent Began At or Before TOD
Yes
No

Total

Descent Got Significantly Above or
Below Normal Profile
Yes
No

Total

Weather on Approach
VMC
IMC

Total

Type of Approach Flown
Visual
Non-Precision
Precision

Total

Total

Hand-Flown/Autopilot
Autopilot
Hand-Flown

Total

Approach Got Significantly Above or
Below Normal Profile
Yes
No

Total
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83 (100.0%)

CAPT Experience
Total Flight Time
Flight Time on Type

Visual Approach Backed-up by
Instrument System
Yes
No

12

Frequency
51 (55.4%)
17 (20.5%)
15 (18.1%)
0 (0.0%)

Frequency
48 (57.8%)
35 (42.2%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
77 (92.8%)
6 (7.2%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
9 (10.8%)
74 (89.2%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
69 (83.1%)
14 (16.9%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
61 (73.5%)
16 (19.3%)
6 (7.2%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
36 (59.0%)
15 (41.0%)

61 (100.0%)
Frequency
72 (86.7%)
11 (13.3%)

83 (100.0%)
Frequency
3 (3.6%)
80 (96.4%)

83 (100.0%)

Table 8: LOSA 2014 Observation List
Obs
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

ID
No
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
51

AC
Type
D328
D328
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
D328
ATR72
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
D328
ATR72
ATR42
D328
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
ATR42

Departure

Arrival

YWG
YRT
YYQ
YWG
YFO
YTH
YGO
YRT
YRT
YEK
YEK
YYQ
YWG
YTH
YYQ
YWG
YWG
YFO
YWG
YTH
YTH
YTH
YEK
YFO
YTH
YEK
YXN
YTH
YGX
YFO
YQD
YSK
YTH
YWG
YWG
YWG
YTH
YWG
YQD
YWG
YGX
YTH

YYQ
YWG
YWG
YQD
YWG
YGO
YIV
YEK
YEK
YYQ
YRT
YWG
YGX
YGX
YWG
YSK
YQD
YWG
YTH
YGX
YFO
ZTM
YYQ
YWG
YWG
YXN
YRT
YGX
YWG
YQD
YWG
YWG
ZTM
YQD
YYQ
YTH
YWG
YQD
YFO
YGX
YTH
YWG

Flight
Time
1.8
2.6
2.4
1.6
1.4
0.7
0.3
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.7
1.6
2.0
0.7
2.7
3.5
1.2
1.6
1.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
1.2
1.3
0.4
0.3
0.6
1.8
0.4
1.2
2.2
1.0
1.1
2.4
1.9
1.6
1.3
0.2
1.7
0.5
1.7

Obs
No
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

ID
No
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
66
93
102
103
104
105
106
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
129
130
131
132
133
134

AC
Type
ATR42
ATR42
D328
D328
D328
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
D328
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
ATR72
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR72
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
D328
ATR42
D328
D328
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42
ATR42

Departure

Arrival

YTH
YGO
YWG
YYQ
YWG
YTH
YWG
YQR
YRT
YUT
YEK
YWG
YGX
YWG
YWG
YGX
YWG
YQD
YWG
YQD
ZTM
YYQ
YEK
YWG
YFO
YWG
YYQ
YWG
YWG
YFO
YWG
YQD
YTH
YTH
YWG
YTH
YWG
YYQ
YWG
YQD
YYQ

YGO
YTH
YYQ
YRT
YTH
YFO
YQR
YWG
YUT
YZS
YRT
YGX
YTH
YTH
YGX
YWG
YQD
YFO
YQD
YFO
YTH
YEK
YYQ
YQD
YWG
YTH
YRT
YTH
YFO
YTH
YQD
YTH
YQD
YQD
YTH
YFO
YYQ
YWG
YQD
YFO
YEK

Flight
Time
0.7
0.7
1.8
0.9
1.1
0.6
1.3
1.4
1.0
0.7
0.7
1.9
0.6
0.7
1.9
1.8
1.0
0.2
1.5
0.4
1.0
0.7
0.7
1.2
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.2
1.8
0.8
1.5
0.8
0.8
1.9
1.3
0.6
2.8
2.0
1.6
0.4
0.7
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Figure D: LOSA 2014 Observation Map

14

CAV LOSA | 2014

THREATS
LOSA threat prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by threat category.
Table 9: Threat
Threat Prevalence
Environmental Threats
Weather
Airport
ATC
Environmental Operational Pressure
Airline Threats
Aircraft Malfunction
Airline Operational Pressure
Cabin/Cockpit
Dispatch/Paperwork
Ground/Ramp
Ground Maintenance
Manuals/Charts

Total

Threat Discussed by Crew Prior to Encountering
Yes
No

Total

Threat Outcome
Inconsequential
Lined to Flight Crew Error

Total

Frequency
42% (32)
4% (8)
16% (29)
5% (9)
23% (42)
8% (15)
11% (21)
4% (8)
8% (15)
1% (1)
2% (2)

42% (78)

58% (106)

100% (184)
34% (62)
66% (122)

100% (184)
84% (155)
16% (29)

100% (184)

LOSA observers recorded a total of 184 threats over the course of 83 observations, an average of 2.2 threats per flight. The
vast majority of threats were encountered by crews during only two phases of flight: Pre-departure/Taxi (42%), where crews
were more likely to encounter Airline threats, and Descent/Approach/Landing (33%) where they were more likely to
encounter Environmental threats.
Figure E: Threat Prevalence by Phase of Flight
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Figure F: Top Threats Bar Graph
Aircraft Malfunction

42

Weather

32

ATC

29

Cabin/Cockpit

21

Airline Operational Pressure

15

Ground/Ramp

13

Dispatch/Paperwork

10

Environment Operational Pressure

9

Airport
Manuals/Charts
Ground Maintenance

8
4
1

Figure G: Threat Outcomes
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LATENT THREATS
During the Data Verification Roundtables, the Steering Committee encountered a number of findings entered by observers
which did not clearly fit into the TEM/LOSA framework and were not consistently reported by observers, though they did
have validity as complexity which the crew had to manage. While these entries were removed from the dataset, the Steering
Committee elected to have them discussed in the final report as latent threats. A latent threat is an event or condition which
is generally hidden within the system and may not be obvious to the flight crew, such as organizational culture, equipment
design issues, or optical illusions.
In particular, there are 3 latent threats which were prevalent during the LOSA observation period which merit
acknowledgement:


16

Area of Operations: The majority of the organization’s area of operations lay outside of ATC radar coverage and
controlled airspace; only two of the airports which were observed were served by an ATC tower. The vast majority
of flights were flown into or out of airports in Class E control zones or Class G uncontrolled airspace where crews
were required to ensure separation from VFR and in some cases other IFR aircraft. While all of the airports captured
in the LOSA sample were served by approach path lighting or electronic glideslope, the small communities in very
remote areas can offer limited horizons during hours of darkness and present optimal conditions for “black hole”
effect and somatogravic illusions for flight crews.
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Pilot Scheduling/Workload: The observation period ran from August until mid-October. Traditionally, the company
does additional flying in the summer season (fishing lodges, forest fire evacuations); it is also an understandably
desired employee vacation period, which the use of line pilots as LOSA observers would have exacerbated. A review
of monthly flight times for the observation period as compared to the same period in 2013 revealed that ATR flight
crews flew about the same number hours (~58 hrs/mo) while Dornier crews flew slightly more (~49 hrs/mo).The
resultant effect was that certain elements of the pilot group shouldered a greater portion of the workload than other
months where flying hours were more evenly distributed. While the assessment of pilot fatigue by a jumpseat
observer would be highly subjective, onset of fatigue can be insidious and can affect every aspect of human
performance.



RNAV Approach Authority (ATR42/72): At the time of the LOSA, flight crew operating ATR42/72 were authorized
for RNAV terminal and enroute operations, but restricted from conducting IFR RNAV instrument approach
procedures despite being equipped with approach-capable flight management systems. The reasons for the
restriction is related to flight simulator equipage and is beyond the scope of this report, however flight crews were
faced with having FMS equipment in their aircraft which could be used to enhance situational awareness but lacked
the authority (and therefore the procedures and training) to make use of the system to the fullest extent. This had
the added effect of varying individual levels of systems knowledge, personal work-around procedures and strategies
being used throughout the pilot group.

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS
Environmental Sub-Threat: Weather
Flight crews managed the most prevalent weather threat –
thunderstorms – very effectively, displaying high levels of
situational awareness and being willing to delay flight
progress to mitigate risk.


Using the weather radar in position on the runway
to scan the departure path, and then asking ATC
for an immediate turn after takeoff in order to
avoid the worst of the weather

Table 10: Environmental Sub-threat - Weather
Weather
Thunderstorms/turbulence
Icing only
Other adverse weather threat
Crosswind, tailwind, gusty or high winds aloft
IMC only
Turbulence only

Total

Frequency
13
7
5
4
3
1

33



Active use of weather radar enroute to deviate around convective weather and discussing contingency plans



Captain delayed the departure by 30 minutes to allow thunderstorms to pass over the airport.

In several cases, crews were either unable to access current weather information for their destination, or the information that
they obtained had changed by the time of arrival.


Crew expected VFR weather at destination without weather reporting; weather turned out to be overcast at
between 900-1000 feet.



Destination airport wind information was not available, so the crew picked up weather from the nearest airport which
was reporting (90NM away); the crew conducted a straight-in approach with a tailwind which resulted in an unstable
approach.



Crew obtained weather from a CARs operator prior to descent. Clouds were reported to be scattered at 1000 feet;
actual conditions were found to be overcast at 1200 feet on the approach.

Environmental Sub-Threat: Airport
The airport threats encountered were largely related to
conditions at the time of the flight as well as the airport
facilities themselves.


Birds on the runway and in the area of the
approach path

Table 11: Environmental Sub-threat - Airport
Airport
Other airport threat
Other runway threats
Contaminated taxiway/runway

Frequency
4
2
1

Total

7



‘Misleading’ PAPI indications on approach



Two windsocks installed next to each other, making it difficult for the crew to interpret on short final (airport
upgrades were in progress)



In one case, the crew spotted an individual walking parallel to the runway approximately 20 feet from the edge while
taxiing for departure.
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Environmental Sub-Threat: ATC
Air Traffic Control is often cited in LOSAs for providing a
meaningful proportion of threats; this also held true in this
safety audit. ATC instructions often present the crew with
some form of ‘change’ which must be understood, briefed
and managed between the flight crew, particularly when
the change was not anticipated. Many ATC threats would
be considered as benign, everyday aspects of flight in
controlled airspace, however crews encountered many
which required active intervention and management.

Table 12: Environmental Sub-threat - ATC
ATC
Other ATC threat
ATC command – challenging clrnces, late changes
ATC error
ATC runway change
ATC language difficulty
ATC radio congestion

Total

Frequency
14
6
3
3
1
1

29



ATC cleared a flight to wrong-way altitude for direction of flight. The crew did not question the clearance; the
controller eventually queried the crew as to why they had stopped their climb (at their assigned level-off altitude) and
were then cleared to their flight planned altitude.



Runway changes due to shifting winds or offered to the crew by ATC for efficiency



When taxiing for departure at an uncontrolled airport, crews interrupted checklists or briefings in order to accept an
IFR clearance from FSS radio (4 cases)



Flight was vectored in tight for a visual approach. The beacon crossing restriction was cancelled and ATC asked the
crew to ‘keep it in tight’



Crew inbound to land was cleared to a waypoint which was not easily or readily located on a chart. Crew had correct
spelling, though took several minutes to locate the waypoint – was only published on the ‘ARKAY ONE’ departure
chart in the CAP.



ATC Tower called an aircraft on short final seeking information about where the crew planned to exit the runway

Environmental Sub-Threat: Environmental Operational Pressure
All events logged in this category by observers related to
conflicting traffic and aircraft sequencing in and out of
uncontrolled environments.

18

Table 13: Environmental Sub-threat - Environmental Operational
Pressure
Environmental Operational Pressure
Traffic (air or ground congestion)

Frequency
9



Total
VFR aircraft operating in the vicinity (with and
without transponder, not always represented on TCAS)



Inaccurate/inconsistent estimates from other aircraft, and multiple aircraft inbound to land at destination with same
estimated time of arrival



ATC gave a crew a departure clearance with a restriction to be airborne by a specific time due to inbound traffic,
however the traffic was several minutes earlier than expected. Crew taxied clear of runway and cancelled their
clearance to avoid rushing the departure.



A particular challenge occurs when crews attempt to estimate the time available to taxi, complete checklists and
briefings and for the Flight Attendant(s) to secure the cabin for departure when other aircraft are inbound to land.
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AIRLINE THREATS
Airline Sub-Threat: Aircraft Malfunction
Crews occasionally operated aircraft with equipment
deferred in accordance with the Minimum Equipment List
(MEL); observers noted high levels of awareness and
management of the associated operational implications
and substitute procedures (APU generator [D328], brake
temperature
monitoring
system
[ATR],
propeller
synchrohpaser [ATR]).

Table 14: Airline Sub-threat – Aircraft Malfunction
Aircraft Malfunction
Aircraft malfunction unexpected by crew
MEL/CDL with operational implications
Other aircraft malfunction threat
Automation event or anomaly

Total

Frequency
26
8
5
3

42

Various relatively minor malfunctions and anomalies were encountered, including issues with an audio control panel, a
missing control knob from a transponder which prevented a crew from squawking their assigned code, a yaw damper that
would not engage, an altimeter which was intermittently presenting an ‘OFF’ flag, and flight idle gate that would not open on
touchdown. There were also two anomalies which presented themselves with regularity in the dataset:


Master Caution / EFIS COMP – Heading (ATR): This alerts the crew that there is a discrepancy between the
Captain and FO heading information in excess of 5°. This alert was highly prevalent; on one observation it occurred
twice during a 14 minute flight and on another it occurred three times within 15 minutes on a 40 minute flight, and
all occurrences in the dataset were seen on flights operating in Northern Domestic Airspace. The flight crew did not
always acknowledge the alert, only reaching up to cancel it the Master Caution. The QRH checklist was not
consulted in any case, though the checklist items were completed from memory by the crew.



Master Caution / BLEED SOV FAIL (D328): This alert is very similar to the one described above; the fault was a
common occurrence and crews reset the valve switch, completing the QRH checklist by memory without physically
referencing it.

A number of issues in the cabin were brought to the flight crews’ attention by flight attendants. These issues included a
problem with a galley service panel and several issues with lavatory doors; one door continuously coming off of its tracks, and
another door jammed closed while someone was in the lavatory.
Finally, there were two abnormalities which were serious enough that they required air turnbacks. One event involved a
Master Warning / Elec Smoke immediately after takeoff (ATR), and the other involved uncontrollable cockpit/cabin
temperature (hot) due to a malfunction in the air conditioning system.

Airline Sub-Threat: Airline Operational Pressure
While this sub-threat category is open to some degree of
subjectivity, observers noted events which had the
potential to create internally-driven (individual) or externallydriven (organization) expectations to rush, continue
operation, or to deviate from accepted procedure.

Table 15: Airline Sub-threat – Airline Operational Pressure
Airline Operational Pressure
Operational time pressure (delays, OTP, late arriving
pilot or aircraft)
Other airline operational pressure threat

Total

Frequency
11
4

15



Crew planning & coordination close to departure time: Issues were noted with late delivery or amendments to
passenger manifests, the absence of a passenger manifest (charter flight), and delays in confirming fuel loads in
order to minimize possible bumping of baggage or cargo.



Late departures: Late departures were noted in 55% of the LOSA sample, though observers only noted this as a
threat to the crew in 6 cases (cargo/loading delay, lightening/thunderstorms in area, late arrival of aircraft, crew
scheduling miscommunication), though none were found to be consequential.



Aircraft serviceability issues passed from crew to crew and implied expectation to continue operation: There
were two instances where observation crews accepted verbal information from the previous flight crew about
intermittent serviceability issues, though maintenance had not been contacted, nor a defect entered in the aircraft
journey logbook.
In one of those cases, the previous Captain mentioned having difficulty with the cockpit/cabin temperature
controller, but that he was able to get it working. The LOSA observer’s entry explained, “The Capt taking over called

maintenance and asked them to check the system, no snag was recorded in the journey log, nothing was MEL'd.
Maintenance's response was that they couldn't find anything wrong, it sounded like an air cycle machine might be
acting up, but it was an 8 hour job and $30,000 part.” The flight departed and resulted in an air turnback when the
temperature could not be controlled.
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Airline Sub-Threat: Cabin/Cockpit
Over half of these threats logged by observers involved Table 16: Airline Sub-threat – Cabin/Cockpit
the interruption of a checklist or briefing by a call from the
Cabin/Cockpit
Frequency
Flight Attendant (main door closure, commissary order,
Cabin event/distraction/interruption
12
Flight attendant error
4
and ‘cabin secure’). In some cases, crews acknowledged
Significant
cockpit
distraction/interruption
3
the interruption and re-ran checklists, though in many
Other cabin/cockpit threat
2
others the crew carried on. Observers noted that crews
Total
21
were very willing to interrupt their task and immediately
communicate with the Flight Attendant rather than finishing their briefing/checklist and then responding. Despite this, only
one instance was linked to a flight crew error.
The sterile cockpit policy between cockpit and cabin crew was not complied with in two cases, though it appeared that the
Flight Attendant may have been unaware of the aircraft’s position.
In one case, a flight attendant was seriously injured after attempting to un-jam a lavatory door (finger); the flight crew asked
her to come the flight deck so that they could assess the extent of the injury.
Another relevant aspect of this sub-threat group is that 86% occurred at or below 10,000ft, and 50% of threats happened
while the aircraft was on the ground.

Airline Sub-Threat: Dispatch/Paperwork
Threats logged in this category were primarily related to Table 17: Airline Sub-threat – Dispatch/Paperwork
the operational flight plan (OFP). Errors on the OFP were
Dispatch/Paperwork
Frequency
noted by crews with respect to routing & cruising altitude,
Dispatch/Paperwork Error
6
Other dispatch/paperwork threat
1
the omission of MEL items on the aircraft and inaccurate
Dispatch/paperwork
event
1
aircraft weight and balance configuration - these were
Total
8
resolved through collaborative discussion with Flight
Dispatch. There was a case however where the crew did not notice that their expected routing (direct to destination) was
actually filed via airways until they received their clearance from ATC, despite having a copy of their flight plan.

Airline Sub-Threat: Ground/Ramp
Crews encountered threats on the ground related to
aircraft movements and aircraft loading and unloading.

Table 18: Airline Sub-threat – Ground/Ramp
Ground/Ramp
Other Ground/Ramp threat
Ground crew error

Frequency
9
6

Roughly half of the threats that were logged were
associated with aircraft arriving at a destination and ground
Total
15
support was not ready and available. In several instances,
marshallers were not available to direct aircraft on the ramp, and ground power units (GPU) were not available prior to
shutdown.
Aircraft loading errors were encountered, presenting a threat for flight crews to manage. There was an event where
dangerous good were found to be loaded on the aircraft without the crew being aware (the crew coordinated with Cargo and
obtained a NOTOC), and another where cargo had been improperly loaded (paint loaded on its side and leaked) in the cargo
compartment between the cockpit and the cabin (crew contacted Maintenance for guidance and cleaned up the mess). Other
errors comprised of events where load control forms detailing the cargo weight on the aircraft were not available to the crew.
Observers separately logged two threats related to weight and balance issues onboard ATR72 ‘combi’ aircraft where the
crew intervened. In one case, passengers were deplaning and cargo crews were unloading the aircraft simultaneously and
the crew became concerned about the aircraft becoming ‘tail-heavy’ (crew asked cargo to unload the tail baggage
compartment first). In the other case, the crew arrived to find the aircraft loaded significantly ‘nose-heavy’ with cargo, and due
to the low passenger load on that sector, passenger weight would not bring the center of gravity (CofG) into limits (the crew
had cargo re-distribute the cargo on the aircraft).

Airline Sub-Threat: Ground Maintenance
The only threat logged in this category was related to the
crew identifying a discrepancy with the “next maintenance
required by XXXX” card inside the journey logbook (the
crew contacted maintenance and resolved the issue).
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Table 19: Airline Sub-threat – Ground Maintenance
Ground Maintenance
Maintenance error

Total

Frequency
1

1

Airline Sub-Threat: Manuals/Charts
Three of the four threats were logged in relation to
approach plates found to be missing from the flight deck
(aircraft libraries contain two copies of the relevant Canada
Air Pilot volumes; one of those volumes was missing).

Table 20: Airline Sub-threat – Manuals/Charts
Manuals/Charts
Other Manuals/Charts threat

Frequency
4

Total

4

Summary
The crews that were observed discussed only 1/3 of the threats they encountered prior to encountering them. This may
reflect weak threat awareness or identification, or perhaps that crews encounter certain threats so frequently that they have
become accustomed to their existence. The most frequently discussed threats prior to their encounter were Weather (14%)
and Aircraft Malfunction (8%). Conversely, the most frequently encountered threats which were not discussed prior to their
encounter were Aircraft Malfunction (15%), ATC (13%) and Cabin/Cockpit (11%).
The vast majority of threats encountered (84%) resulted in inconsequential outcomes; in 29 cases though, crew
mismanagement of the threat was linked to at least one error being committed. Aircraft Malfunction (11 cases) was the most
frequent error-linked threat, followed by Weather (6 cases) and ATC (4 cases). Coincidentally, these same categories
represent the most frequently encountered threats which were inconsequential as well.
A review of the altitude at which threats were encountered reveals the prevalence of threats at lower altitudes. The vast
majority of threats were encountered below 10,000ft (78%), with nearly half (47%) occurring on the ground, suggesting that
crews encounter most threats near the beginning and near the end of their flights.
Figure H: Threat Prevalence by Altitude
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ERRORS
LOSA error prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by error category.
Table 21: Error
Error Prevalence
Aircraft Handling Errors
Automation
Flight Control
Ground Navigation
Manual Handling
Systems/Instrument/Radio
Procedural Errors
Briefing
Callout
Checklist
Documentation
PF/PNF
SOP Cross Verification
Other Procedural
Communication Errors
Pilot to Pilot
Crew to External

Total

Frequency
4% (10)
4% (10)
<1% (1)
7% (18)
9% (23)
2% (6)
11% (28)
14% (34)
1% (3)
6% (15)
9% (22)
15% (36)
11% (28)
6% (14)

25% (62)

58% (144)

17% (42)
100% (248)

LOSA observers recorded a total of 248 errors over the course of 83 observations, an average of 3.0 errors per flight. The
majority of errors occurred during Pre-departure/Taxi (25%), Takeoff/Climb (19%) and Descent/Approach/Landing (33%)
phases of flight. In all phases, Procedural errors were the most frequently observed.

Figure I: Error Prevalence by Phase of Flight
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Figure J: Top Errors Bar Graph
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AIRCRAFT HANDLING ERRORS
Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Automation
The errors noted in this category reflect errors in executing
automation tasks, as well as decisions on how automated
systems were used.
Events related to autopilot and flight director use were
noted:




Table 22: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error - Automation
Automation
Wrong MCP/FCU altitude setting dialed
Discretionary omission of FMC/FMGC data
Failure to execute a FMC/FMGC mode when needed
Inappropriate disconnection of automatics
Wrong MCP/FCU heading set or dialed
Wrong MCP/FCU mode left engaged

On departure, the heading bug was not aligned
Total
with the runway; when the autopilot was
engaged at 1000 ft AGL, the aircraft immediately banked in the wrong direction

Frequency
2
1
1
1
1
1

7

Crew received a new clearance and entered it in the FMS, though ‘NAV’ mode was not selected. The aircraft flew
through the desired track in ‘HDG’ mode; crew noticed the error when the aircraft was 2.4 NM left of the track in
controlled airspace.

The decision to select a particular altitude in the altitude pre-selector was identified on multiple flights. In situations where the
crew was flying above an overcast layer but anticipated VMC weather for the approach at destination, the crew set what they
referred to as a “VFR altitude” in the pre-selector which was below the minimum IFR altitude (25NM safe altitude). There
were cases where the aircraft broke out of cloud above the minimum IFR altitude and had visual contact with the ground;
there were others however where risk was increased, as described by one observer:

“The Captain told the FO he was planning the visual approach into [destination] because the last weather
out of [nearby airport] (approximately 50nm SSE of [destination]) was VFR at 3000 feet overcast and greater
than 6 miles visibility.
The Captain asked for an altitude of 1400 feet to be set in the ADU and began a descent on profile
approximately 35nm from Gods Lake Narrows; the FO didn't challenge him on it. 1400 feet is the minimum
altitude for the NDB approach into [destination] (100NM safe alt is 2500ft; 25NM safe alt is 2200ft).
The weather in [destination] turned out not to be VFR. It was overcast at approximately 900-1000 feet with
good visibility. The crew descended below the 25nm safe altitude and below published procedure turn
altitudes and levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport on the
inbound approach track.”
It is worth noting that in the above described event, the aircraft inbound track and approach course were nearly aligned; the
NDB is at the airport and there is no FAF for this approach. The aircraft levelled out at the MDA within the safe area, though
this profile (700t AGL at 7NM from airport) generated a GPWS terrain warning due to configuration (noted in UAS section of
this report, p.35).
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Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Flight Control
Events in this category were largely related to errors or
omission or awareness.

Table 23: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Flight Control
Flight Control
Wrong thrust/power settings
Other flight control error
Decision to use wrong thrust/power
Intentional Noncompliance – Other flight control error

Frequency
5
2
1
1



Crew did not conduct a ‘max thrust’ takeoff when
taking off into icing conditions



Crew forgot to reduce thrust from ‘max takeoff’
to ‘max climb’ after takeoff (detected and
corrected at 7000ft)



Crew advanced condition levers to ‘max’ prior to landing to ‘provide better reverse thrust capability’ (ATR72)



PF requested flap extension above max flap extension speed (PNF advised and delayed extension until within limit)



Several airspeed overspeed deviations during descent due to excess power



Engine #2 over-torque to 96% during climb

Total

9

Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Ground Navigation
The only event logged in this category related to a crew
which began maneuvering for an incorrect taxi route which
was quickly identified by the FO and corrected by the
Captain.

Table 24: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Ground Navigation
Ground Navigation
Attempting or turning down a wrong
gate/taxiway/ramp/hold spot

Total

Frequency
1

1

Manual Handling
The manual handling errors observed can be grouped into
a handful of themes:




Above descent profile/High on approach:
Multiple instances were noted where the aircraft
became high on the normal descent profile or
high on the final approach path; some of the
approach deviations were the result of the abovenormal decent profile.

Table 25: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Manual Handling
Manual Handling
Unintentional speed deviation
Unintentional vertical deviation
Speed deviation by choice
Intentional Noncompliance – Intentionally flying a
nonstandard visual approach
Intentional Noncompliance – Intentionally not following
published Jepp procedures
Unintentional crosswind technique
Unintentional weather penetration

Frequency
5
4
2
1
1
1
1

Speed deviations: Multiple high speed events
Total
15
were noted, though unlike the profile deviations
above, speed events were much more likely to result in an undesired aircraft state. Airspace speed violations were
also noted several arrivals into Winnipeg, where there is a requirement to slow to 200kts or less when within 10NM
and 3000ft AGL of the airport. In one case, the aircraft was at 230kts at 2300ft AGL 7NM from the airport and only
began to slow in order to configure, and in another the aircraft was at 245kts at 2300ft AGL when ATC advised the
crew, “you have 100kts on the 737 in front of you” and instructed them to slow.

The combination of these factors (multiple errors) resulting in an unstable approach was observed as an aircraft transitioned to
a visual approach into Flin Flon. The crew was using an RNAV approach waypoint (FAF) to conduct a visual approach. The
FMS/autopilot anticipated the turn to final approach inside the FAF and the approach was flown at high speed, attaining the
approach path by short final. A 10kt tailwind was noted by the crew on short final, and combined with the flare which was
initiated at REF+10, the aircraft floated and used up most of the runway in order to stop.
Finally, an event occurred where the crew intended to deviate around convective weather on descent, but ended in an
inadvertent weather penetration. The crew had been briefing the approach when they were interrupted by a ‘cabin secure’
call from the Flight Attendant. During the interruption, the PF selected a heading to deviate around the weather ahead. When
the crew resumed their briefing, they diverted their attention away from the weather; the initial heading was not sufficient
and resulted in the aircraft flying through the convective cloud anyways.
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Aircraft Handling Sub-Error: Systems/Instrument/Radio
The largest portion of Aircraft Handling errors belong to
this category. Some of the notable events are detailed
below.


Nav Frequencies/Displays: Cases where a
frequency was not set or selected, or where a
display was not used when appropriate. As an
example, a crew briefed the visual approached,
backed up by the NDB; the crew flew the visual
approach, however the NDB remained tuned to
another frequency.

Table 26: Aircraft Handling Sub-Error – Systems/Instrument/Radio
Systems/Instrument/Radio
Other systems/inst/radio error
Wrong altimeter settings
Wrong TCAS setting
Incorrect climb or descent callouts
Wrong anti–ice setting
Wrong nav radio frequency dialed
Wrong ATC frequency dialed/selected
Wrong Bug Settings
Intentional Noncompliance – Other systems/inst/radio
error

Total

Frequency
7
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
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System Tests: Several errors were logged where
crews attempted to test the anti-skid braking system on the ATR while the aircraft was taxiing, which is potentially
hazardous and can interfere with braking ability.



TCAS Selection: Several instances were observed where crews had different mode selections on their TCAS
displays, and appeared to be unintentional. As one observer detailed, on a departure out of Thompson, “The Capt’s
TCAS was set for 40NM (Normal) and the FO’s TCAS was set for 10NM (Down)”. While there is no existing policy
on how crews should display TCAS information and crews are generally free to set the display as the situation
warrants, it was notable that there were no discussion between the crews about why they had the selections up
that they did and often the setting for takeoff was the setting that was used during the arrival on the previous leg. It
is worth noting that the TCAS system will issue both Traffic (TA) and Resolution Advisories (RA) regardless of what
is being displayed to the pilots.
The TCAS system will not however issue TA/RA information or guidance when the system is not turned on. It was
observed on two flights that crews noticed the TCAS was not turned on prior to departure. Both events occurred on
the same aircraft (ATR42 C-FCIJ), which upon further review is the only ATR aircraft in the fleet which is not
automatically activated and requires crew activation on each flight. It is also worth noting that the aircraft is a
Freighter aircraft which operates in non-radar and uncontrolled airspace for the vast majority of its flying.



Incorrect Altimeter Settings: There were four instances where altimeters were set with the wrong altimeter
setting, and thus displaying an inaccurate altitude. Three of these instances occurred during descent and in each
case crews successfully trapped the error when it was caught in the Descent Checklist, or by reconfirming the
correct setting with the FSS. The remaining instance occurred during the climb, was not trapped by the crew, and
resulted in an altitude excursion. The crew was climbing to a cruising altitude of FL090 in northern domestic airspace
and became distracted by a Master Caution alert; they failed to set their altimeters to 29.92 prior to level off, and
subsequently leveled off 400ft above their cruise altitude.
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PROCEDURAL ERRORS
Procedural Sub-Error: Briefing
The errors in this category are interesting because they
appear to speak to cultural norms that exist in the
organization, particularly with respect to visual approaches.

Table 27: Procedural Sub-Error - Briefing
Briefing
Incorrect/incomplete approach brief
Intentional Noncompliance – Incorrect/incomplete
approach briefing
Omitted approach briefing

Frequency
3

2
For reference, aircraft-specific SOPs at the time of the
LOSA required that, (a) crews conduct approach briefings,
1
Total
6
and (b) and ‘AMORTS’-style approach briefing be
conducted “when a visual approach is not assured”. No explicit guidance existed as to how crews were to conduct briefings
for visual approaches. Recall from the sample descriptives that visual approaches represented 74% of the approaches
observed in the LOSA and that the Captain and First Officer had flown together before in 88% of the flights sampled. Crews
commonly abbreviated the approach briefing in these circumstances, as was noted by the observers:



“VFR for runway XX”



“The visual, backed up by the ILS”



“What I did yesterday…cross track to the left”

Discussion during the data verification process challenged whether these could be considered as errors when crews did not
have explicit guidance on visual approach briefing standards. The entries were upheld when the observer provided context as
to how the practice presented additional risk to the flight. In multiple cases, visual approaches were briefed where IMC
conditions prevailed on the approach (in one of these cases, weather at the destination was not available to the crew).
Observers noted that crews omitted basic details of how the approach would be flown, i.e.; the transition to the final
approach course, configuration, minimum altitudes, or contingency plans if weather turned out to the lower than expected.
There was also a notable event where a crew was challenged by a transition/approach into an unfamiliar airport on while on a
charter flight which lead them to a non-standard approach planning & briefing, though the situation resulted in an
inconsequential outcome.

“Crew picked up the ATIS for YQR; RNAV 31 approach was in use. Aircraft and crew were not certified for
RNAV approach and the only other approach to that runway was an NDB. Crew became distracted
discussing how to conduct the approach, and their transition to the approach. They briefed a ‘hybrid’ NDB
RWY 31 approach, setting up the ILS to RWY 13 with hopes that a backcourse signal would help them get
better accuracy than an NDB only approach (no backcourse approach exists). While distracted with the
approach briefing, the crew neglected to reduce the power and got an aircraft overspeed warning. The crew
eventually called the field ‘visual’, and were cleared by ATC for a visual approach.”

Procedural Sub-Error: Callout
As detailed in the breakdown of this category, many errors
were either the omission of a callout, or a pilot using an
incorrect callout for the situation.


Omitted callouts: Some of these errors were
simply calls that were not made, particularly in
response to a callout by the other pilot, such as
when leaving the current altitude for another,
calling ‘clear right/left’ when taxiing from parking
or across a runway/taxiway, or altitude awareness
calls on approach.

Table 28: Procedural Sub-Error - Callout
Callout
Other callout error
Omitted altitude callouts
Omitted climb or descent callouts
Omitted approach callouts
Incorrect climb or descent callouts
Incorrect approach callouts
Incorrect V–speed callouts

Total

Frequency
10
6
4
3
2
1
1
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In 6 cases, altitude capture calls were omitted. Context provided by the observer identified distraction as a factor in
each; in the final 1000ft to the level-off altitude, the crews had been reviewing scoop sheets, approach plates,
completing logsheet entries, or engaged in non-essential conversation. In one case, the crew was in discussion with
the Flight Attendant regarding problems with the lavatory door. While none of these omissions resulted in
consequential outcomes, they reflect breakdowns workload management and task scheduling.
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Incorrect callouts: The use of incorrect or substitute language or phraseology in callouts was noted. As an example,
many crews replaced after landing/rollout calls (“my aircraft/my pole”) with phraseology used in aircraft they had
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previously operated (“your pole/my pole”). Similar to omissions, the use of incorrect callouts did not result in any
consequential outcomes, though they do reflect a deviation from standards published in SOPs.

Procedural Sub-Error: Checklist
This sub-category represents the 2nd most frequent crew
error type in the sample.


Checklist
interrupted:
Interruptions
were
identified multiple times as threats to crews while
completing checklists and briefings (the takeoff
and approach briefings are items on the normal
checklist), there is only one case logged where
the observer felt that the crew mismanaged the
threat. FSS called the flight to provide the crew
with a departure clearance and a Captain stopped
his takeoff briefing so that the FO could copy the
clearance. When he was finished copying, the FO
finished the Capt’s takeoff briefing for him and
continued on with the checklist.

Table 29: Procedural Sub-Error - Checklist
Checklist
Intentional Noncompliance – Checklist performed from
memory
Intentional Noncompliance – Self–initiated checklist (not
called for by CA)
Intentional Noncompliance – Omitted abnormal checklist
Omitted abnormal checklist
Omitted checklist
Checklist performed late or at the wrong time
Intentional Noncompliance – Checklist not performed to
completion
Intentional Noncompliance - Self-initiated checklist (not
called for by PF)
Intentional Noncompliance - Use of non-standard
checklist protocol
Intentional Noncompliance – Omitted checklist
Missed checklist item
Wrong response to a challenge on a checklist
Other checklist error

Frequency
9
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1



Checklist item deferred: There were events
where a checklist item was differed so that the
Total
34
checklist could be completed out of sequence,
with the intention of remembering to complete the deferred item later. In one instance, a crew elected to skip
“Cabin Secure” (inconsequential) and in another, the crew deferred shutting off the bleed air to the cabin until the
flight attendant had secured the cabin for departure (linked to additional error). The crew was required to depart with
bleed valves off for performance reasons (ambient temperature); they forgot to deselect bleed air and took off with
the bleed valves on.



Checklist completed from memory: The instances where this was observed were confined almost entirely to the
“Before Takeoff/Line Up” and “Shutdown” checklists, evenly split. The only exception was one event where the
“Taxi” checklist was completed from memory.
Similar, one event was recorded where an engine was started before both crew members were in their seats,
without any checklist being completed.

The crew had just unloaded the aircraft and were clearly ready to get the return flight going; the
aircraft was secured expeditiously. As both crew members were getting settled in their seats, the
Captain initiated a start on engine #2 prior to any checklist being completed. This seemed like a
normalized procedure; the FO did not intervene and was completely aware of what was
happening. All normal checklists were completed prior to taxi.


QRH not referenced: Crews dealt with malfunctions (ACM pack fault, EFIS COMP-HDG, flap malfunction, DC GEN
fault) without consulting the Quick Reference Handbook without any consequential outcomes. In one event however
the crew not only neglected to reference the QRH following an APM fault – they elected to simply turn off the APM
for the remainder of the flight.



Checklist omitted: The “Cruise” checklist/flow was the most frequently omitted checklist. There was only one
other instance where the “Descent” checklist was forgotten by the crew until it was detected at 1400 ft AGL; the
crew was operating a short sector with a 6000 ft cruise altitude.

Procedural Sub-Error: Documentation
The three errors logged in this subcategory relate to the
following events:




“Proper C of G was not calculated prior to
departure. Crew was radioed by CSAs with actual
baggage location only after they had departed and
were climbing out.”

Table 30: Procedural Sub-Error - Documentation
Documentation
Wrong weight and balance information recorded
Misinterpreted items on flight documentation
Other documentation error

Total

Frequency
1
1
1

34

“Flight plan accepted by Captain with incorrect aircraft configuration reflected (OEW & Index). Aircraft was in 42 seat
config, flight plan showed them in 34 seats, this wasn't noticed until arrival 2 stations later.”
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“The fuel slip was forgotten and therefore the fuel uplift was not able to be checked against the remaining fuel as
written in the journey log. The first officer asked the captain if he got the fuel slip, however it was left in the fuel
panel and the engines were already running. It was retrieved after the flight. The consequence was that the fuel
uplift was not confirmed prior to departure other than checking the fuel gauges.”

Procedural Sub-Error: PF/PNF Duty
The dominant situation captured in this category by the
observers occurred when the Pilot Flying (PF) made
system, mode, or FMC selections while hand-flying the
aircraft, rather than asking the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) to
make the selections on their behalf. All of these events
occurred in the Takeoff/Climb phase of flight, with most
occurring just after takeoff and at low altitude.


“PF turned the heading bug and selected LNAV
while hand flying and with no cross verification.”

Table 31: Procedural Sub-Error – PF/PNF Duty
PF/PNF Duty
PF makes own MCP/FCU changes
PF makes own FMC/FMGC changes
Intentional Noncompliance – PF makes own MCP/FCU
changes
Intentional Noncompliance – PF sets own flight controls
or switches
Intentional Noncompliance – PNF carried out PF duties
z – Other PF/PNF duty error

Frequency
7
3
2
1
1
1

Total

15



“The Captain made inputs in the FMS and ADU while he was hand flying. The FO did not challenge him.”



“Just after rotation, PF asked for yaw damper to be engaged. PNF selected yaw damp, but nothing happened. The
PF then reached up and pushed RESET on the ADU, but the yaw damp would still not engage. The PF continued to
hand fly the departure, and the crew resumed trouble-shooting at 5000’ and engaged the autopilot. The crew was
unsure of what caused the problem, but the autopilot and yaw damper were now engaged.”

Procedural Sub-Error: SOP Cross Verification
While observers coded these errors based on the context
in which they watched them occur, the 22 errors in this
category were associated with only 4 types of events:
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Table 32: Procedural Sub-Error – SOP Cross Verification
SOP Cross Verification
Failure to cross–verify FMC/FMGC inputs
Failure to cross–verify MCP/FCU/altitude alerter changes
Failure to cross–verify altimeter settings
Intentional Noncompliance – Failure to cross–verify
MCP/FCU/altitude alerter changes
Failure to cross–verify clearance
Omitted flight mode annunciation

Frequency
10
6
2



Activation/Execution of FMC function: One pilot
single-handedly makes changes to the flight plan
2
in the FMC which affect (or will affect) the flight
1
path of the aircraft. This was frequently
1
associated with an ATC clearance (“Proceed
Total
22
direct BIRLA direct Winnipeg”) or when
transitioning from enroute to approach by proceeding ‘direct’ to an approach fix. The other pilot may have been
aware of the change without verbalizing it, however there were cases where the other pilot was preoccupied with
other duties when the change was made.



Confirmation of altitude selection: The altitude preselector is set to a new altitude, but verbal confirmation is not
made to remove any doubt that both pilots are aware of the new selection. Observed in all phases of flight.



Flight director/autopilot mode selection/change: Mode selections done without verbalization. Though both pilots
may have been anticipating the selection, there were instances where the other pilot was ‘head’s down’ and
otherwise preoccupied and did not observe the selection. In one event, the crew was preoccupied with an approach
briefing as the autopilot correctly captured the selected altitude. The crew did not immediately notice the level-off,
and therefore did not verbalize the automatic mode changes (ALT); the crew detected the situation just prior to the
overspeed warning.



Crosscheck on receipt of new altimeter setting: Crew independently set their own altimeters on receiving a new
altimeter setting, though no verbalization or crosscheck. Often the altimeters were correctly set, however in the
event described below, an error was made and not immediately trapped by the crew:

“ATC gave the crew the clearance, "Descend 5000, Winnipeg altimeter 29.77", and once the crew
read this back, ATC advised, "fly your present heading, plan the NDB 18". All altimeters were set to
the ATIS message of 29.81. While the Captain was reading back the descent clearance to ATC, the
FO reset his altimeter to the updated 29.77 setting. The Captain had read back the clearances and
set the altitude selector, but did not update his altimeter or the standby altimeter to the new
setting. Approximately 3-4 minutes later, ATC gave a descent clearance to another company flight,
including the altimeter setting. The Captain then crosschecked his own altimeter and updated to
the new (29.77) setting, along with the standby altimeter and announced, "29.77" to which the FO
acknowledged, but had already set.”
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Procedural Sub-Error: Other Procedural
This subcategory is a collection of errors which are not
captured in another procedural category. Most are
independent and unique, and the more notable events are
summarized below:


VFR flight in MVFR weather: ”Crew elected to

fly VFR to destination with ceilings at 1000 AGL;
the aircraft was flying in and out of the bottoms of
the clouds during the cruise portion of the flight
and had to identify and maintain separation from
another aircraft inbound to destination at the
same time.” (Earlier in this flight, the crew had
detected that they had forgotten to turn the TCAS
system on)

Table 33: Procedural Sub-Error – Other Procedural
Other Procedural
Other procedural error
Duties performed at inappropriate time
Intentional Noncompliance – Admin duties performed at
inappropriate times
Intentional Noncompliance – Other procedural error
Intentional Noncompliance – Operation with unresolved
aircraft malfunction
Crew omitted cabin/flight attendant call
Intentional Noncompliance – Failure to use proper WX
SOP
Intentional Noncompliance – Inappropriate taxi–in or out
without wing walkers
Wrong MEL action performed

Total

Frequency
10
8
6
6
2
1
1
1
1

36



Emergency after takeoff: Crew encountered smoke in the cockpit immediately after takeoff. Memory items and
smoke checklist from QRH done prior to acceleration altitude and before aircraft was cleaned up. Crew was
challenged to remain organized and checklists were completed out of sequence and at inappropriate times.



System tests (system not installed): “Captain performed pre-flight check on a system that was not installed on the

aircraft (cargo fire suppression). The FO informed the CA that the system was not installed on the aircraft and that
testing the system would not do anything.”


MEL operational procedure mismanaged: “The crew forgot to delay the retraction of the landing gear in

accordance with the MEL operational procedures associated with the brake temperature monitoring system being
unserviceable. The Captain realized their mistake after the gear was already raised. The crew may have been
distracted from a previous error where there was a misunderstanding of the ATC clearance just prior to departure.”


Crew direct CSA to aircraft with engines running: “Crew directed CSA to approach aircraft with both engines

running to deliver paperwork. Passenger forgot Medical Papers in the terminal. Crew taxied back to the terminal and
asked agent to pass the papers through the document door. Crew discussed shutting down #1 but agreed they
would get a hot start if they did. Crew briefed the ground agent and it was ok with her.”


Takeoff with APM off: “While taxiing out, crew got a Master Caution- Icing due to an APM Fault. The FO attempted

a quick reset, but was unable to reset it. He asked the Capt if they would like to do the QRH, the Capt said "no, just
turn it off". The rest of the flight was conducted with the APM off.”


Engine start (propeller brake) without marshaller: “CAPT started "#3" (engine with prop brake ON) without asking
if the engine was clear from a marshaller or from the FO. He did not run any checklist until after the engine was
started.”

There were however two issues which were logged on multiple flights:


FO brake test: “FO did not test his brakes during taxi checklist”; “Brake test not conducted by FO”.



Admin duties performed at inappropriate time (taxi):
-

“FO was "head's down" completing paperwork for entire taxi route, beginning on the runway and ending at
the gate.”

-

“Completion of paperwork, and checking cell phone texts while taxiing in.”

-

“Logbook completed on the taxi; PNF "head's down" for entire taxi route.”

-

“FO completed logbook on the runway in the backtrack.”

-

“FO completing paperwork during ground taxi. Did not help in maintaining an active awareness on taxi in.”

-

“PNF made logbook entries while the aircraft was taxiing on the runway.”
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COMMUNICATION ERRORS
Procedural Sub-Error: Pilot to Pilot
Sterile cockpit violations made up over 75% of the errors Table 34: Communication Sub-Error – Pilot to Pilot
in this subcategory. Non-essential conversation was noted
Pilot to Pilot
Frequency
in all phases of flight at various altitudes below 10,000ft
Intentional Noncompliance – Sterile cockpit violation
20
Crew Miscommunication of Information
3
AGL. Crews appeared to manage conversations around
Failure to communicate approach information
3
radio calls and checklists with mostly inconsequential
Total
26
outcomes, although some crews committed callout errors
which were linked. While most sterile cockpit errors were related to conversations, some were associated with non-essential
tasks at inappropriate times:

“As the aircraft was holding short of the departure runway, a noise could be heard over the intercom. The
FO asked if everybody had turned off their cellphones. The Capt responded, "No, I think mine is still on" and
then shut his off.”
In one event, the Captain and First Officer appeared to be on ‘different pages’ with respect to their departure, as described by
the observer below:

“The crew was issued a HOLD SHORT clearance in their taxi instructions (Runway 13, W-F-P, HOLD
SHORT Runway 18). The FO read this clearance back as the aircraft turned out of its parking position. As
the crew was taxiing along FOXTROT, the Capt asked the FO about the hold short clearance, "We're
supposed to hold on Papa?" The FO confirmed this for him. The Capt then responded, "I guess we're using
13 today". This exchange suggested that neither pilot had discussed the departure runway with the other
and both pilots may have been focused on other things as their began the taxi out (Capt taxiing aircraft, FO
reading back clearance).”

Procedural Sub-Error: Crew to External
Several events were logged where a pilot responded to a
similar callsign, or missed a call from ATS. In all of these
events, the crew trapped the error, and it was usually the
other pilot that detected the error. There were events
where there was a mistinterpretation of ATC instructions
with no consequential outcome:

Table 35: Procedural Sub-Error – Crew to External
Crew to External
Misinterpretation of ATC instructions
Missed ATC calls
Other crew to external communication error
Intentional Noncompliance – Other crew to external
communication error
Crew omitted ATC call
Wrong position report
Wrong readbacks or callbacks to ATC

Frequency
3
3
3

“ATC gave a speed restriction of "210 or less",
The PNF read back "Calm Air XXX, slowing".
Several minutes later, the PF asked the PNF if
Total
they were supposed to slow to 210kts or less, to which the PNF replied, "No, I think he just said '10 knots
less'". ATC subsequently for speed reductions to 170kts, and finally to 150kts or less, which the PF
complied with.”
There were others however which were linked to additional flight crew errors:

“First Officer wrote down the correct clearance (CYTH-CYWG FPR FL190) but then assumed the
Thompson ONE departure was given, which it was not. The captain queried the first officer’s
understanding of the clearance but then accepted the FO’s understanding as correct. LOSA observer told
crew to clarify with ATC prior to taking off, at which point it was confirmed the Thompson ONE departure
was not given and the correct altitude was selected in the ADU prior to departure.”

30
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2
1
1
1

14

Summary
The commission of errors between Captains and First Officers was nearly identical (42% and 41% respectively). Captains
were more likely to commit checklist and PF/PNF duty errors, while First Officers were more likely to commit “other
procedural” and systems/instrument/radio errors.
Table 36: Error Descriptives
Figure K: Error -“Who Caused it?”
25
20
15

Captain
First Officer

10

Error Caused By
First Officer
Captain
All Crew Members
Nobody
A/C Systems
Flight Attendant

Total

Error Detected By
Nobody
Captain
First Officer
All Crew Members
LOSA Observer
ATC
A/C Systems

5
0

Total

Crew Response
Failed to Respond
Trap
Exacerbate

With respect to detecting errors that had been made, Captains were more
likely to detect callout, crew-to-external communication and manual handling
errors. First Officers were more likely to detect checklist, flight control and
“other procedural” errors. Of the errors which were logged by observers, the
Captain and First Officer detected only 30% of them; 65% of all errors went
undetected by the flight crew.

Total

Outcome
Inconsequential
Undesired Aircraft State
Additional Error

Total

Frequency
105 (42.3%)
101 (40.7%)
35 (14.1%)
4 (1.6%)
2 (0.8%)
1 (0.4%)

248 (100.0%)
161 (64.9%)
35 (14.1%)
35 (14.1%)
10 (4.0%)
4 (1.6%)
2 (0.8%)
1 (0.4%)

248 (100.0%)
169 (68.1%)
66 (26.6%)
13 (5.2%)

248 (100.0%)
219 (88.3%)
19 (7.7%)
10 (4.0%)

248 (100.0%)

Figure L: Error -“Who Detected it?”
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Captain
First Officer

Similarly, flight crews failed to respond to
68% of the errors which were made. This
could support the fact that the crew did not
detect roughly the same proportion of
errors. Crews took action by trapping 27%
of errors and exacerbating the situation
(making it worse) in 5.0% of errors.
Despite the rates of detection and response
by flight crews discussed above, nearly
90% of errors resulted in inconsequential
outcomes. Having said this, in 10 cases the
crew made an additional error while
managing the situation, and in 19 cases,
crew action (or inaction) resulted in an
undesired aircraft state.
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A review of the altitude at which errors occurred reveals the prevalence of errors made at lower altitudes. Much the same as
was noted with threats, the vast majority of errors were made below 10,000ft (78%), with (38%) occurring on the ground,
suggesting that error commission rates are higher near the beginning and near the end of flights.

Figure M: Error Prevalence by Altitude

Pre-Departure/Taxi
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Takeoff/Climb

Cruise
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Taxi/Park

UNDESIRED AIRCRAFT STATES
LOSA UAS prevalence and findings are detailed below by phase of flight and tabulated by sub-category.

Table 37: Undesired Aircraft States
UAS Prevalence
Aircraft Handling
Ground Navigation
Incorrect A/C Configuration

Frequency
96% (22)
0% (0)
4% (1)

Total

100% (23)

LOSA observers recorded a total of 23 undesired aircraft states over the course of 83 observations, an average of 0.28 UASs
per flight (one UAS for every 3 flights). All but 3 undesired aircraft states occurred in the Descent/Approach/Landing phase of
flight: there was one UAS associated with an Incorrect Aircraft Configuration and the remainder were all related to Aircraft
Handling.

Figure N: UAS Prevalence by Phase of Flight

Figure O: Top UAS Bar Graph

Unstable approach

10

High speed deviation

4

Vertical deviation

4

Incorrect systems/instruments
/radio configuration

1

Lateral deviation

1

Long landing

1

Off centerline landing

1

Unnecessary weather penetration

1
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UAS Sub-Category: Aircraft Handling
The most frequent Aircraft Handling UAS observed was
unstable approach, which is discussed in more detail
below. High Speed and Vertical Deviations were the
second most frequent, followed by several events which
were only observed once each. Due to the low number
and relatively higher risk of undesired aircraft states, each
are detailed below.


Table 38: UAS Sub-Category – Aircraft Handling
Aircraft Handling
Unstable Approach
Vertical Deviation
High Speed Deviation
Lateral Deviation
Long Landing
Off Centerline Landing
Unnecessary Weather Penetration

“The crew descended below the 25nm safe
Total
altitude and below published procedure turn
altitudes and levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport.

Frequency
10
4
4
1
1
1
1

22

The weather in [destination] turned out not to be VFR. It was overcast at approximately 900-1000 feet with good
visibility. The crew descended below the 25nm safe altitude and below published procedure turn altitudes and
levelled off at 1400 feet ASL (700 feet AGL) approximately 7nm from the airport on the inbound approach track. The
GPWS issued a terrain warning as the aircraft approached 1400 feet. The aircraft had broken out of the clouds
around 1600 feet and the crew had ground contact at the time of the warning.”


“Aircraft was significantly above the intended vertical path during the descent, necessitating a descent angle outside
of normal operations (4.1 degrees). Crew was able to re-capture the desired vertical path with reverting to a lower
level of automation.”



“Crew leveled off 400' above desired altitude during climb. As opposed to descending to initial altitude, crew elected
to keep climbing to FL110. Uncontrolled airspace, no violation.”



“Excess power led to aircraft overspeed clacker detecting the condition. PF reduced power, and shallowed the
descent to recover.”



“Aircraft high on approach. Aircraft remained "all white" on the PAPIs until short final.”



“The tailwind was noted at 10 knots on short final. Flare was initiated at Vref+10 although the aircraft had achieved
approach slope by short final. Due to tailwind and fast approach, most of the runway was used. Crew used more
reverse and braking than normal.”



“The aircraft was briefly oversped through flight level 185 on descent.”



“Aircraft banked away from desired flight path when autopilot was engaged. Heading bug wasn't aligned with
runway, so aircraft banked once AP was engaged. Crew accepted the deviation and continued.”



“VMO overspeed. PF immediately reduced the torque. No verbal response.”



“Crew Flew though a CB. The Crew was distracted by the FA, and Approach Briefing. There was no communication
between PF and PNF on the ADU changes. All this resulting in the Aircraft flying through a CB creating an
unnecessarily bumpy ride.”



“PF lost directional control due to incorrect aileron inputs for the cross-wind on the Landing rollout. Captain quickly
took control and recovered the aircraft.”



“VMO Overspeed protection engaged in descent. PF reduced thrust and corrected the fault.”

UAS Sub-Category: Incorrect Aircraft Configuration
During data verification, the steering committee elected to
include an event within this sub-category based on the
UAS defining criteria which says that a UAS “occurs when
the flight crew places the aircraft in a situation of
unnecessary risk” and “can also occur as a result of
equipment malfunction” (ICAO, 2002, p.2-4).

Table 39: UAS Sub-Category – Incorrect Aircraft Configuration
Incorrect Aircraft Configuration
Incorrect systems/instruments/radio configuration

Total

Frequency
1

1

In this event, the crew received information from the flight crew handing the aircraft over to them about a possible issue with
the air conditioning system. Based on the information that they had at the time, and after consulting Maintenance personnel,
the crew departed with the anticipation that they would be able to control cabin temperature, however the situation increased
risk to the passengers and crew.
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"Once airborne the temperature in the cockpit only got hotter. FA was notified of the problem and that crew
was unable to control it, the FA was going to monitor it and keep the pilots notified of the situation. Pilots
worked with maintenance on the radio and discussed options of what to do; LOSA Observer was asked to
contribute as a crew member and assisted in reviewing the QRH, resetting breakers, etc.
FA called to say people were sweating in the back, one passenger was not feeling well due to the heat. At
this point the crew decided they could not continue the flight due to health reasons and diverted back to
Winnipeg (Approximately 50N of YWG). The cockpit was unbearable at this point, the temp was pegged at
35+ degrees, and switches were hot to the touch. Crew discussed options of cooling the cabin as there
are no SOP or QRH direction for this, one bleed was shut off to reduce the hot airflow but maintain
pressurization. The crew did a good job maintaining control of the aircraft, the PF directed jobs to the PNF
and myself. Considering the situation and extreme heat, everyone focused on the task at hand.
Visual approach was completed and kept in tighter than normal to get the passengers on the ground as
quickly as possible and start ventilating the cabin and cockpit of the extreme heat.”

Unstable Approach Breakdown
Stabilized approach criteria are published in Standard Operating Procedures for all aircraft types (ATR42/72, Dornier 328JET,
Hawker Siddely HS748). Current policy requires states that “All Calm Air aircraft must be on a stabilized approach profile by

1000 feet AGL and must remain within these parameters until touchdown. Any deviation from a stabilized approach profile
MUST result in a missed approach.”
Ten approaches were logged for being outside at least one element of the stabilized approach criteria. Each unstable
approach is detailed on the following page. High speed events were the most common deviations observed, and in all but
two cases, the approaches were flown in VMC. A go-around was not conducted in any of the events logged.

Table 40: Approaches Outside of Stabilized Approach Criteria
Calm Air Stabilized Approach Criteria
1. Aircraft is continuously in a normal position to land and only small changes in
heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path
2. Aircraft speed is not more than VAPP (Vref) + 20KIAS and not less than VAPP
(Vref)
3. Aircraft is in the correct landing configuration.
4. Sink rate is no greater than 1000 fpm, if an approach requires greater than 1000
fpm, a special briefing must be conducted
5. Power setting appropriate for the approach configurations.

Approaches
Outside of Criteria
2
5
1
2
-

6. All briefings and checklists have been completed

-

7. ILS approaches must be within one dot of the localizer and glideslope.

-

8. On circling approaches wings must be level by 300 feet AGL

-

9. Non-precision approaches must be within 10° of course

-
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Figure O: Unstable Approach

Table 41: Unstable Approach Descriptions
Obs
ID
12

Aircraft
Type
ATR42

Pilot
Flying
Captain

Recovery
Altitude
500ft

Observer Description
Crew levelled off at 700 feet AGL without the aircraft being configured to land. The crew
continued the approach and did not initiate a go-around.
Flaps 15 and gear down were selected approximately 5nm from the airport at 700 feet above
ground. Flaps 30 was select 500 feet above ground. Airspeed control was good on the
approach once the aircraft was configured. Despite the airspeed control being good, the
approach was not stable because of the very late selection of flaps.

17

ATR42

First Officer

300ft

Earlier in the approach, the PNF stated to the PF that “you better get down your very high”.
The PF selected 1000FPM in the VS select on the autopilot, this was not enough to regain
slope, the PF turned off the autopilot and hand flew.
Decent rate was about 1400fpm until 1 mile final 300ft AGL. At this time a normal approach
was maintained.

23

ATR42

First Officer

900ft

Approach speed was up to VRef+25, but was corrected at 900 feet AGL.

39

ATR42

Captain

600ft

Tight base to final on visual approach

40

ATR42

First Officer

500ft

Airspeed on approach was in the VRef + 25-30 range between 1000 AGL and 500 AGL, but
was within VRef-VRef+20 by 500 AGL.

41

ATR42

Captain

500ft

Descent was flown at high speed. Rate of descent was 1400 fpm down through 1000 ft AGL
and was corrected to less than 1000 FPM by 500 ft AGL.

113

ATR42

First Officer

500ft

VRef+30 down until roughly 500' AGL

Outside of stabilized approach criteria at 600. Crew continued approach to landing.

Entered stabilized approach criteria through roughly 500' AGL. Aircraft was a freighter
returning empty.

115

ATR42

First Officer

200ft

Aircraft was VRef+45 at 400' // +40 at 300' // +15 at 150'. (ATR72, empty)

121

ATR42

First Officer

300ft

The crew conducted a contact approach in VMC by flying towards the FAF for CYFO RNAV
18. The aircraft passed abeam the airport at Vmo. As the aircraft was approaching the fix at
Vmo, the FMS calculated the rate of closure and initiated a turn to final much too early.
The ADU was selected to HDG mode to compensate and the aircraft was navigated on final
approach directly to the threshold from this early-turn point. This resulted in an approach path
that was laterally offset from centerline by 30 degrees.
The aircraft was not on centerline until 1NM final. All other criteria for stable approach were
met.

122
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ATR42

Captain
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900ft

The aircraft did not meet stable approach criteria (Vref +20) until 900 feet AGL. The UAS was
not detected and the approach continued normally.

Summary
Captains and First Officers were responsible for causing an equal number of
undesired aircraft states, and were responsible for an equal proportion of
unstable approaches.
Most events went undetected by the flight crew, as perceived by the LOSA
observer. Considering the number of high speed deviations and lower altitude
configurations that make up the unstable approach events, it could be
suggested that both pilots were aware and/or comfortable about the condition
of the aircraft at that moment; because they took no action, the observer
would have logged this as not being detected. Of 10 unstable approaches,
only one was detected by the crew.
Despite not being detected, most UASs were mitigated by the crew and
resulted in recovery.
A review of the altitude at which UASs occurred reveals the prevalence at
lower altitudes. Much the same as was noted with threats and errors, the vast
majority occurred below 10,000ft (87%), with (70%) occurring below 1000ft
AGL.

Table 42: UAS Descriptives
UAS Caused By
Captain
First Officer
All Crew Members
A/C Systems

Frequency
10 (44%)
11 (48%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)

Total

23 (100.0%)

Error Detected By
Nobody
Captain
First Officer
All Crew Members
A/C Systems

13 (57%)
5 (22%)
0 (0%)
4 (17%)
1 (4%)

Total

23 (100.0%)

Crew Response
Mitigate
Failed to Respond
Additional Error

17 (74%)
6 (26%)
0 (0%)

Total

23 (100.0%)

Outcome
Recovery
End State/Incident/Accident
Additional Error

Total

18 (78%)
5 (22%)
0 (0%)

23 (100.0%)

Figure P: UAS Prevalence by Altitude

Pre-Departure/Taxi

Takeoff/Climb

Cruise

Descent/Approach/Land

Taxi/Park
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CREW QUESTIONNAIRE
LOSA observers offered crews the opportunity to respond to a set of questions about the operation. These were normally
conducted verbally during a low workload portion of the cruise segment, or on the ground at the end of the flight. Crew
responses are offered below as they were recorded by Observers.

Training: Is there a difference in how you were trained and the reality of line operations? If so, why?


Roughly half of the responses were directed towards training and use of the FMS on the ATR fleet. Some of their
comments are quoted below:
-

“There is very little FMS covered in the training and none in the simulator training.”

-

“Yes there is a difference because there is no FMS in the simulator. The reality of line operations vs sim
training is very different because of this.”

-

“FMS use in the plane versus none in the sim. Not trained for any FMS use, and especially irregular ops. Sim
training seems foreign with heavy emphasis on NDB approaches, but I have yet to do one on the line.”

-

“The captain was very adamant in stating that the ATR pilots are flying online differently than what is expected
(according to regulations) when it comes to approaches in the north. There are many times when full procedure
circling approaches should be conducted according to regulations, but a straight in approach using GPS fixes is
done instead (since it is considered safer and more efficient). Since the ATR is not certified for GPS approaches
(and do not have those approaches in the database), this is not according to the COM or SOPs but is common
practice.”

-

“Why are full procedure approached trained for new FOs in the sim but immediately discouraged during line
indoc by line indoc captains? Training does not line up with the reality of line operations. FMS isn’t touched
during training. The first time a new FO sees the FMS is on line indoc. Use of true heading in NDA is ignored
because the aircraft are incapable of satisfactory precession levels.”



Remarks were made about the way that stalls were described in the SOPs compared to the way that they are trained in
the simulator.



Finally, several crews offered comments about a lack of structure in line indoctrination training, and incomplete exposure
to all of Calm Air operations (fuel/freighters/arctic/scheduled pax).

Standardization: How standardized are other crews that you fly with? If there’s a lack of standardization,
what do you think is (are) the reason(s)?


Mostly standardized, though there are variations. Some responses alluded that crews can be selectively standardized
when they want or need to be.



As this question was asked to a crew, each member offered their thoughts, which often differed based on their seat.
Captains noted that FOs were mostly standardized, while FOs noted that some Captains often have their own
procedures or habits for certain situations, such (i.e.; “some Captains call for a checklist, others just expect you to start
it”). One Captain suggested that standardization was excellent with junior FOs, but that FOs with more experience often
developed their own habits.



Most crews pointed to SOPs as a key reason for variation in standards.
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-

SOPs sometimes too vague, open to interpretation

-

Incorrect, not updated in several years (e.g. APM, PF/PNF responsibilities for ADU [ATR])

-

SIM Instructors train SOPs, then Line Training Captains train to ignore SOPs that don’t work in the real world

Crews also cited certain “quirks” that crews imported from other aircraft types which did not apply to their current
aircraft type.
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Automation: What are the most significant automation catches (traps) for this aircraft?


[ATR] “There is no clear SOP for switching from a HEADING to a NAV situation (i.e.; ATC vectors, then

'cleared on course).(1) some people fly in HDG mode and then arm NAV mode.(2) Some people set up FMS
HDG CMD, then arm NAV.”


[ATR] “Mode select stuff, when to do it, how to do it properly.”



[D328] “As the jet transitions into ASEL, if you move the pitch wheel, auto pilot goes into "PIT" mode and
will descend or climb through selected altitude.”



[ATR] “PUSDO ILS in dual FMS. PNF/PF confusion over who does what on the ADU, heading bug, course
bar. SOP's should be more like the jet where the PF owns the panel when the autopilot is on, and the PNF
owns it when the PF is hand flying.”



[ATR] “The most significant trap for this aircraft is that people are not being properly trained on the use of

the FMS. No real operational training and no FMS training in the simulator (no FMS instrument procedures
training device that can be used by crews).”


[ATR] “Different FMS configurations among the fleet. No fleet standardization, and not differences training

is provided.”

Overall Safety Improvements?


Flight Ops


Equipment - Crews cited aircraft equipment issues as opportunities for improvement:
-

“It would be nice to see laser gyros put into the aircraft, EFIS COMP faults are often ignored and will
one day cause major issues. Significant terrain and irregular compass readings make for an accident in
the making to crews not intimately familiar.”

-

“RNAV approval. The single greatest safety improvement is sorely overdue.”

-

“Request made to standardize the center pedestal layout of the ATR fleet to the greatest extent
possible. (FMS installed in center for single FMS installations; radios and panels laid out in the same
configurations).”



Ground Support – Crews discussed inconsistent availability of marshallers at ground stations, and inconsistent
loading of aircraft to the point where it is difficult to open the cockpit door due to bulging cargo nets. Pilots also
felt that having to pass along commissary lists over the radio increased their workload near the end of their
flights.



Resources – Comments were related to how resources were assigned to tasks that they felt was important to
the operation.



-

“Resources! A couple people can only do so much. "Old school" mentality vs. "new school."”

-

“Flight Ops does not devote enough resources to the ATR. The Jet program seems to have all the
attention when it is only 15% of the company. We need a dedicated manager to take care of the ATR
the way that the CP has done for the jet.”

Fatigue Management – Many crews responded strongly to this issue. They felt that there was a need to
improve the safety culture with respect to fatigue management. This ranged from general staffing levels and
high monthly credit averages, suggesting that crews would report to work unfit for duty, to more specific flight
duty assignments.
-

“Flt Ops needs to look at fatigue management with pairings and adding flights at the end of the day to
guys. Fatigue is a huge issue at CA, doing max amount of flying with bare minimum crews.”

-

“Need to stop scheduling crews for 14 hour duty days on paper when everyone knows that the day
will never get completed forcing crews to feel the need to extend days, rush, etc, we are doomed from
the start.”
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Dispatch – Some crews noted that their interactions with Flight Dispatch were good, and that they were showing
improvement. Others cited more specific challenges and areas for improvement:
 Crews expressed a lack of confidence in their Flight Dispatcher at times, citing high turnover and challenges
with quality control. They also expressed an expectation that Flight Dispatch should be “a step ahead of
them” when they landed at their next destination with respects to loads, performance planning, weather,
etc.
 Communications: Language barriers with Flight Dispatchers who are not primary English speakers, creating
opportunities where things are lost in translation. Also cited communication with other stakeholders, such
as cargo and operations coordination where there is sometimes a disconnect (e.g. more Flight Dispatcher
input on load control).



Airport – Crews shared their thoughts on issues related to company operations, airport infrastructure and ATS
support.
 “There is no one at fishing lodges to provide safe passage to and from the aircraft on the ramp or runway in

some cases. I have been there and people are all over the place.”
 “LED Airport lights are awesome.”
 “Poor CARs hours in the high arctic”
 “More VASI/PAPI in northern Manitoba. Better winter maintenance with CRFI info. More GPS approached if

we ever get certified.”
 “We need better knowledge of runways conditions, CRFI and RSC would be nice for all airports.”
 “There is no weather or altimeters at certain arctic airports on weekends or after hours. How do we

conduct our jobs safely?”
 “Northern Manitoba (ie Oxford House, etc) should have current CRFI/RSC (not from the day before). Also,

how can Gillam provide CRFI and others cannot? Having more VASIS/PAPIs installed would be helpful.
Calm Air should be an advocate for change for these things.”


Air Traffic Control
 “YTH ONE departure needs to be always or never. It causes confusion and is random”
 “In YTH, give us the TH one departure all the time or never. Someone is going to or maybe has busted the

departure procedure because it’s so random when we get cleared it. Its should be standard like Winnipeg.
When cleared flight plan route, crews need to be careful with what dispatch files us (ie. YQD, Ambil,
YWG)”
 “A Churchill SID would be nice on IFR days.”
 “At or below 15,000' 30nm North of YWG is a restriction that is irregularly applied, tough descent planning,

and ATC always gets mad, even though it's not published anywhere.”
 “The 50N waypoint from YYQ-YEK is crap. Some operators don't use it, sometimes ATC clears you direct.

Just have a procedure with CZWG Centre that YYQ-YEK even altitudes, YEK-YYQ odd altitudes.”
 “YYQ 357 50DME transition is dangerous, planes are climbing and descending at one spot with radio

changes- AMBIL crossing at 15,000ft or below is often left until the transfer to arrival when its often too
late, this should always be given to us.”
 “An arrival should be built for approaching Winnipeg from the north. They’re always expect 15000' at 30

nm north of Winnipeg but it's not published.”
 “Arrival in to YWG to better plan descents and load approaches. Should be using arrivals in to YWG on
every leg. Is ATC not aware we can do them? They don't even give it to us when we file them.”


SOPs
 Crews offered specific suggestions:
-

[ATR] “42 checklists need APM Addition of a “line” in initial prestarts and enroute checklist prior to

doors and hatches.”
-

[ATR] “ATR checklists need a review. There are items missing that should be included. Ex: APM is

not included in SOPs or in Checklists.”
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-

[ATR] “Captain should always advance the power levers, FO's should always set the power as the

captain is trying to keep the plane straight on the runway, not looking inside the cockpit”
-

[ATR] ”Stalls/Fire on departure/profile diagrams in the SOPs are wrong.”

-

[ATR] “"5 Up" calls aren't necessary. No reason AP can't be used below 5,000'”

-

Confusion about application of stabilized approach criteria (IMC vs. VMC, circling)

-

Confusion about application of company memos on SOPs

 As well as suggestions more general in nature:
-

“SOP's need to reflect what we are really doing on the line, and in training.”

-

“Any amendment since inception has been clerical in nature and with little to no line input!”

-

“Need a committee ( not just office people who may not fly on a regular basis)”

-

“More amendments. NOTHING has changed in the 5 years I have been on this plane.”

General comments and feedback about the LOSA observation


The Captain was positive regarding the LOSA experience and his only comment is that he looks forward to the
results.



Crew was optimistic that the LOSA process will improve safety at Calm Air, by identifying higher risk areas of the
operation.



Generally speaking the LOSA was very well received and the crew felt it was a good step forward. They are hoping it
will improve safety and efficiency. The FO felt the observations would be biased as everyone would be on their best
behavior.



The Captain does endorse the concept of LOSA but was very upset about the company decision to implement this in
the summer during a very busy time when monthly credits are high. The Captain was about to refuse the
observation to help prove his point to the company, but changed his mind.



“LOSA should not be conducted when all pilots are working crazy amounts, 100+ credits a month, called on most
GDO's etc . Good program, happy to see something proactive for a change.”



“Eye opening, good program, look forward to seeing the results and final report. Some guys might treat the LOSA as
a line check and change the way the fly for the LOSA, because of this results may be off”



They both were supportive of the LOSA program, but not happy it was started during a very busy time with high
credits for everyone. Also, did mention that at times they may have done things incorrectly just because of the
"nervousness" of being watched.



Crew was positive and supportive of the LOSA. Once crew member feared that some pilots would treat an
observation as a line check and be on their best behavior...negating some of the valuable findings that might be out
there.



“Appreciate the time effort and money the company is putting into this program. Hopefully the company does
something with the results, most of the issues have been happening for a long time and management is aware, they
were just swept under the rug or ignored in the past.”



“good program, it’s nice to see something proactive rather than always being reactive. Happy its being done.”



Possibly could have been conducted at a better time (IE. when crews were less busy)



“Need a focused LOSA for freight/fuel hauls. Don't feel that the reality of the work I do is being observed. Lots of
threats outside of the normal area of operations. Concerns about one AME working 24hrs in NW Ontario. Potential
for fatigue during de-ice, etc...Lack of loadmasters is causing concern about employee injury.”



The captain and FO were both positive about the observation experience and glad to have an observer on board.
They seemed hopeful that the data collected would help out the company.



"This is my 4th observation" (FO)



The crew felt that LOSA was a positive addition to our company, and were looking forward to the results.
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Overall perception of the LOSA is good. Crews welcomed it and were eager to see the results. They had nothing
more to add.



Pleasant experience and hope good data can be captured. Doubtful that the data will be acted upon by senior
management.



“We are skeptical that the company will effect actual change based on this LOSA program but we hope the
managers make actual change to improve everything.:



“Why not do LOSA on Hawker, bulk fuel, or others types of flights instead of mostly scheduled flights?”



“I think LOSA is a good idea.”



“great program, sad to hear guys are getting turned down from some flights, hopefully CA does something with the
results.”
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DISCUSSION
This section of the report offers discussion on some of the trends that were found in the data.

Comparisons by Aircraft Type
The sampling plan attempted to capture observations from each aircraft type in proportion with the number of annual flying
hours of each type, and was a logistical limitation of the LOSA. Because of this, fleet summary information is provided in
Table 43 as advisory information only, and the bottom ‘CAV Fleet’ line reflects the normalized Calm Air data across all types.
Table 43: LOSA TEM Fleet Summary
Fleet
ATR42
(51 Obs)

ATR72
(15 Obs)

Dornier 328JET
(17 Obs)

CAV Fleet
(83 Obs)

Threat

Error

UAS

Threat
Frequency
(per sector)

Error
Frequency
(per sector)

UAS
Frequency
(per sector)

109

144

16

2.14

2.83

0.31

31

61

4

2.07

4.07

0.27

44

43

3

2.59

2.53

0.18

184

248

23

2.22

2.99

0.28

While making comparisons between fleet types is not statistically appropriate due to the low sample size, a meaningful
variation of events between aircraft types was not observed; that is to say that the events appeared to occur in roughly the
same proportion regardless of the aircraft type. While the error rate for the ATR72 appears higher than the ATR42 and
D328JET, the number of observations (15) is too few to suggest that those errors did not simply occur by random chance.
Having said this, it is worthy to ask ourselves whether crews are more likely to commit errors while flying the ATR72 given
that crews are rated on both that ATR42 and ATR72, that the ATR72 was introduced to the fleet 5 years after the introduction
of the ATR42, that the ATR72 accounts for less than half of the total ATR fleet (2 aircraft dedicated to freighter ops) and that
most crews likely fly the ATR42 more frequently than the ATR72. Again, statistically we cannot say that more errors were
observed in this LOSA, though it could be indicative of a trend.

Visual Approach Briefings
Current SOP for ATR42 and ATR72 is that an approach briefing is required “any time that a visual approach is not assured”.
SOP for the D328JET was amended shortly after introduction of the aircraft to the fleet requiring that an AMORTS-style
approach briefing is required for all approaches, VMC or IMC.
Briefing errors were noted in some detail in the Error section of this report (see p.26), and noted that crews often abbreviated
briefings in visual conditions. The discussion also cited the high prevalence of visual conditions on approach, and the high
frequency of Captain/First Officer having flown together before. This high degree of familiarity with the crew, the conditions
and the airport likely supports the crew’s habits to abbreviate approach briefings down to “VFR for 24” or “the visual, backed
up by the ILS”. Having said this, in reviewing the unstable approaches within the sample one might wonder if both pilots
understood completely how the other was planning the flight path of the aircraft, speeds and configuration changes, runway
exit point, etc. Greater detail may have driven the PNF to speak up when his/her mental model of the approach no longer
matched the aircraft’s position, path or configuration, prompting corrections or a go-around by the PF.
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Approach Briefings & Descent Checklist
Observers noted that slightly more than half (58%) of crews conducted their approach briefing prior to the top-of-descent
(TOD). Previous LOSA studies (Sumwalt, Thomas, & Dismukes, 2002) have found that crews who brief after the TOD commit
60% more errors during the descent/approach/landing phase than their counterparts. In the CAV LOSA, we found only a 13%
increase in errors during the same phase if the crew briefed after the TOD. When considering this figure it should also be
worth noting that crews conducted approaches in VMC conditions 83% of the time and flew a visual approach 74% of the
time. The error rate may have been higher if more non-precision or precision approaches were flown in IMC conditions, such
as would be prominent during certain times of year in our area of operations.
An interesting theme developed when comparing the Observer’s narratives of the Descent/Approach/Landing phase which
suggests multiple interpretations of approach briefing practices and checklist use.
Fleet SOPs provide expectations for the contents of IFR approach briefings, though they do not explicitly discuss at what
point in the flight they should be completed. On each aircraft type, initiation of the Descent Checklist occurs when crossing
through 18,000ft in the descent. The final checklist item on the ATR fleet (3rd final on the D328) is “APPROACH
BRIEFING…..COMPLETE”.
Observers noted that some crews anticipated higher workload in the descent phase, and elected to brief the approach during
cruise, nearing the TOD while their workload was still low. In these cases, when the crew reached “APPROACH BRIEFING”
in the Descent Checklist, the PF stated “COMPLETE” as to indicate that it had been completed. Other crews conducted their
approach briefing when directed to by the checklist; that is, when they reached “APPROACH BRIEFING”, they would
“COMPLETE” it at that point.
An approach briefing is a common task required by the PF and is routinely completed in less than 2 minutes. During the
descent phase, aircraft are generally descending at rates be 2000-2500 feet per minute, suggesting that while the PF is
completing an approach briefing, the aircraft can descent through up to 4000-5000 feet of airspace. The task becomes more
complex when it is interrupted by ATC instructions, interphone calls from the Flight Attendant, or aircraft navigation tasks,
which may occur with greater frequency at lower altitudes.
Figure Q: Approach Briefing Windows

This scenario is illustrated in Figure Q, which depicts an aircraft cruising at FL240. A profile for an aircraft cruising at FL340
(D328), as well as a profile for an aircraft at FL120 (ATR42 in Northern Domestic Airspace) have been included as well. The
latter reflects a particular challenge, as the checklist is only initiated at TOD 11,000 feet AGL in most areas, where the
checklist and approach briefing can take up a meaningful amount of altitude. The regions where approach briefings were
being conducted as a checklist ‘DO’ item are displayed by ‘A’. While it is not against company policy to complete the briefings
in these areas, and while LOSA did not reflect significantly higher error rates when they were conducted here, lower risk
regions displayed by ‘B’ represent low workload areas where many crews (58%) elected to conduct their briefings.
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While in no case was this briefing practice logged as an error, it did bring attention to the multiple interpretations of the
Descent Checklist. This is an area worthy of further review.

Intentional Noncompliance Errors
Knowledge of areas of intentional noncompliance is valuable because it can help to assess the degree of procedural drift in
the operation and the areas where it occurs. A better understanding can help identify weak or misunderstood procedures, or
areas where crews have truly found a better way to accomplish a task. It may also identify a normalization of deviance, where
the norm has drifted over time for any number of reasons, to the to the point that crews are being exposed to risks through to
be mitigated. Industry data has shown that on flights without intentional noncompliance errors, the crew see 2.1 errors per
flight. On flights where the crew commits a single act of intentional noncompliance, the error rate climbs to 3.9 per flight, and
where there are two or more acts of intentional noncompliance, the error rate jumps to 7.5 per flight (Werfelman, 2013).
The LOSA Collaborative is a private organization which supports airlines completing LOSAs by conducting much of the data
management and analysis. The organization’s founder was one of the original developers of LOSA at the University of Texas
in the 1990s. As a result of many years collecting de-identified data, their robust database contains more than 20,000
observations from more than 70 airlines around the world (Werfelman, 2013) and allows for comparison against the airlines
(collectively) which have also completed LOSAs. Some of this data has been made public through various industry
publications.
A comparison below is made between common intentional noncompliance errors found in the LOSA Collaborative’s archive,
and the top 5 intentional noncompliance errors logged in the Calm Air LOSA.
Table 44: Common LOSA Intentional Noncompliance Errors
LOSA Collaborative Archive (Werfelman, 2013)

Calm Air LOSA 2014 (Top 5)



Omitted Altitude Callouts

1. Sterile Cockpit Violation



Checklist Performed from Memory

2. Checklist Performed from Memory



Failure to Execute a Mandatory Missed Approach

3. Admin Duties Performed at Inappropriate Times



PF Making Flight Guidance Changes while Hand Flying

4. Self-Initiated Checklist



Taxi Duties Performed While Aircraft is Still on Runway

5. PF Makes Own MCP/FCU changes

Greater awareness among crews of intentional noncompliance zones in their normal flight routines, along with more targeted
enforcement during flight training and line checks could lead to more disciplined flight deck compliance.

Checklist & Briefing Interruptions
A great value of the LOSA process has been the ability to identify sequences of events which present risk to a situation which
had appeared to be normally benign or irrelevant. All Observers were active, line-qualified pilots who likely did not necessarily
see the situation as a threat from their crew seat in the moment, but from the jumpseat and free from cockpit tasks could
readily identify it as a threat.
Crews dealt routinely with the interruption of a checklist or a briefing while in the Pre-Departure/Taxi phase, and frequently at
uncontrolled airports. There were often two interruptions: one when FSS would radio the crew with their IFR clearance, and
one when the Flight Attendant called the crew to advise “Cabin Secure”.
The sequence of events for crews who commonly do multiple legs per day in and out of uncontrolled airports is very familiar
to them. From the LOSA narratives, there is a sense that crews are primarily focused on the tasks to be completed internally
(inside the cockpit) and less on the tasks to be completed externally (ATC & cabin). This is appropriate, however crews were
often quick to break from their task/checklist/briefing to respond immediately to a call from FSS Radio or the Flight Attendant
which could have waited until the checklist was completed. In most cases, FSS used the same phraseology, “Calm Air XXX,
clearance when ready…”, indicating that the crew could respond at their convenience. As was documented in the Threat and
Error sections of this report, crews responded to these interruptions in different ways; some re-ran checklists, while others
finished off the Captain’s briefings or continued from where they left off.
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Observer narratives also noted that there were times when both calls came within seconds of each other. In one case, the
First Officer stopped the checklist and answered the radio call to accept a clearance. While the FO was writing the clearance,
the Captain began dialing up the altitude preselector to the clearance altitude that he overheard on the radio. While the
Captain was doing this, the intercom aural alert went off and the Captain responded to the FA’s “Cabin Secure” call. This all
occurred within about 20 seconds, and the FO picked up the checklist and resumed from where he had left off.
The crew on this particular flight did not make any errors, however the threats they encountered presented opportunities to
misinterpret a clearance and not have it trapped by the other pilot or mis-set switches or systems due to an omitted checklist
item. It is very difficult for FSS or the Flight Attendant to know if they are interrupting with a call to the flight crew, however
the flight crew has the ability to defer/delay response if they are already engaged with an important task. Recognition of a
crew’s vulnerability in this phase of flight is valuable, and more conscious pacing of tasks in anticipation of these interruptions
could be encouraged.

Low Error Detection Rates, High Failure to Respond Rates
At first glance, the fact that 65% of errors went undetected by the Flight Crew may appear alarming. This rate reflects what
the Observer group logged based on the context of the situation, and it is quite possible that the crew did not perceive their
action/inaction as an error.
As an example, a PF is hand-flying the aircraft and is at the same time making entries into the FMC; the PNF watches the PF
make these selections, is aware of what is happening and does not intervene. The event happened, both pilots were aware,
and because there was no negative outcome or additional error, the PNF felt no need to speak up. In this situation, the event
would have been logged as a crew error to which the crew failed to respond.
Similarly, a crew encounters a Master Caution – EFIS COMP (HDG) on the ATR. The crew is familiar with this caution as it
commonly occurs, and the PNF pushes the ‘Master Caution’ button to silence the warning and the flight carries on as normal.
The PNF does not annunciate the reason for the alert, the crew does not reference the QRH checklist associated with the
fault. Due to conditioning and a normalization of deviance, the crew likely did not interpret this as an issue. Again, the
Observer would have logged this as a crew error to which the crew failed to respond.
LOSA categorizes an error as “an error” and treats an incorrectly set minimum descent altitude the same as a missed callout;
severity is not considered. When given the context above, it’s understandable that at 65% undetected error rate is possible
given flight crew norms and ‘SOP creep’. This may be supported by the 68% “failed to respond” crew response to errors –
the crew did not perceive the event to be an error, and therefore they did not respond to it as an error by attempting to trap it.
This should not suggest that this trend should be accepted by flight crews or the organization, but provides a context as to
why these rates may be as high as they are. Efforts to clear up guidance to crews through SOPs and training events, as well
as enforcement by Line Training Captains may see these rates reduce in tandem.

Weaknesses within Fleet SOPs
Crews responded strongly in the Crew Questionnaire when asked about SOPs. Similarly, the Steering Committee was left
with several pages of notes at the end of the data verification process – these were notes from Observer narratives which
identified SOP weaknesses, issues not accounted for, or guidance which was unclear. Further, they were situations where
risk was elevated, but could not be attributed to any crew error. In this sense, a secondary outcome of the LOSA was a
meaningful audit of the SOPs.
There were, however, numerous events where crews made callout, cross verification or PF/PNF duty errors where specific
guidance exists in company documentation and is trained at training events. It is possible to relate to a crew’s sense of
familiarity with the operation, the aircraft, and in particular, the other pilots in the company. Depending on their positions in
the seniority lists, many pilots see a lot of each other, and some (Bulk Fuel Pilots) are crewed together constantly. This
familiarity can be an asset in one situation (communication, assertiveness) and can be a threat in another (complacency).
Situations were observed where the PF was making entries in the FMC and hand-flying at the same time rather than asking
the PNF to make the entry, where a new altitude is set in the preselector but is not confirmed by both pilots, or the altitude
callouts are not made on approach. In most cases, there was a sense that both pilots were entirely aware of what was
happening and safety was never compromised.
In reviewing the crew data for this report, a relevant trend emerges. Of the 90 pilots on staff at the time of the LOSA, 70%
had more than 5 years of service, and many have more than 10 years of service. In the last 10 years, the company has seen a
reduction of the Hawker Siddely 748 fleet, the introduction of the ATR42 and subsequently the ATR72 fleets, the rapid
retirement of the Saab 340 fleet, and introduction of the Dornier 328Jet.
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Figure R: Calm Air Fleet History (2014)

It is worthwhile to note that most pilots, and certainly most Captains, have experience on another aircraft type within the
company. It should not be surprising that crews may revert to previous procedures or callouts of their previous aircraft,
particularly if this was the first aircraft that they trained on when coming to the company – these would be familiar and
habitual. If you combine this with areas where SOPs are silent on an issue or there is vague or unclear procedure, the “SOP
creep” will begin and relocate to a ‘new’ normal where others begin to adopt the deviation as their own habit.
While this may not be a serious issue for some crews, it can present a challenge for pilots who are new to the company.
Having been trained in the flight simulator away from the operation under the guidance of an instructor who’s role it is to
display and encourage SOP compliance and discipline, they are thrown an unexpected curve ball at a critical moment on
landing when their Captain on the flight line calls “your pole” (SAAB 340) rather than the call “my aircraft” (ATR42) like they
were trained and were expecting to hear. Many pilots likely recognize the deviation in their flying partner, though they may
feel that addressing it will come at a cost to crew cohesiveness and opt not to.
The callout, and cross-verification errors and the Crew Questionnaire responses earlier in this report support the trend. SOP
improvements are required in these areas, and particularly in the area of PF/PNF duties with respect to automation
management. Improvement in this area will require both timely and careful amendment to SOPs for clarity and application,
followed by acceptance and disciplined, diligent use by Flight Crews on the line at every level.

Unstable Approach Rate
Unstable approaches are currently an industry hot-topic due to their connection with approach and landing accidents such as
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and runway excursions, which account for 33% of all accidents (Flight Safety Foundation,
2009). Unstable approaches are identified as the highest risk factor with respect to a runway excursion (Burin, 2011).
Of particular concern to the industry and the source of recent research (Smith, Jameson, & Curtis, 2013) is the willingness of
a crew to abandon their approach when outside of the published criteria and conduct a go around. The Flight Safety
Foundation notes that the industry’s rate of unstable approaches is roughly 3.5% to 4%; for every 100 approaches flown, 3-4
are flown outside of stabilized approach criteria. Furthermore, of all unstable approaches, 97% are flown to a landing; in only
3% of unstable approaches are pilots conducting go-arounds, despite guidance to do so. Smith, Jameson & Curtis (2013)
relate the significance of these stats:

“It can be argued, therefore, that the almost complete failure to call go-arounds as a preventive mitigation
of the risk of continuing to fly approaches that are unstable constitutes the number one cause of runway
excursions, and therefore of approach and landing accidents. If our go-around policies were effective even
50 percent of the time, the industry accident rate would be reduced 10 to 18 percent. There is no other
single decision, or procedure, beyond calling the go-around according to SOPs that could have as significant
an effect in reducing our accident rate.”
This LOSA observed 83 sectors over 10 weeks and logged 10 unstable approaches (UAs): Calm Air flew more than 4500
sectors during the same period. This would put the LOSA UA rate was 12%. Statistically, our sample wasn’t large enough to
say this with confidence, but it would relate to approximately 542 unstable approaches over that 10 week period (2800 per
year).
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Having said that, all approaches were logged based on the Calm Air policy that stabilized approach criteria must be met by
1000 feet AGL in IMC or VMC conditions. If we were to apply the traditional Flight Safety Foundation stabilized approach
criteria (1000ft AGL IMC, 500ft AGL VMC) we would only consider 5 of these approaches to have been unstable. That’s a 6%
rate within LOSA observations and potentially 325 unstable approaches during the LOSA period (1690 per year).

Table 45: Unstable Approach Rates
Industry
(AeroSafety World)
Percentage of ALL Approaches
Flown Outside of SA Criteria

3-4%

Percentage of Unstable Approaches where
a Go-Around was Initiated

3%

Calm Air LOSA
2014
6-12%
(estimate)

0%

Based on LOSA data, there is some degree of assurance that Calm Air falls within the industry norms with respect to
unstable approaches. It is difficult to make this type of claim based on only 83 observations when many factors may influence
an approach, such as the weather conditions, the time of day, or ATC influence. A Flight Operations Quality Assurance
(FOQA) program with de-identified flight parameters regularly downloaded to a database directly from the aircraft would be
helpful in achieving a higher level of safety assurance on this important issue.

Communications with Other Departments
LOSA provided individual narratives of flight sectors involving different crews, different aircraft and different routes, but
collectively, they offered insight into how the operation runs, and how the different mechanisms of the organization operate
together when they need to.
The working relationship between Flight Crews and Maintenance Personnel was highlighted in several instances during the
LOSA, and one event in particular sheds light on the issue. A crew arrived with an aircraft with a technical issue, and shared it
verbally with the crew taking over the aircraft, rather than documenting it in the journey logbook or contacting Maintenance
for guidance or troubleshooting. The incoming crew elected to contact Maintenance about the issue prior to departure, and an
Engineer drove over to the airport terminal to assess the situation. The outcome was that the Engineer could not definitively
diagnose the issue and would have to pull the aircraft offline and replace the unit, citing the downtime required and the cost
of the part. The crew was left with that information to make a decision about taking the aircraft, which they did.
The tone of the event reflects a strained working relationship: the flight crew may not want to ‘bother’ Maintenance for
seemingly small or intermittent issues, and a Maintenance Engineer is being asked to assess an aircraft during a short
window between flights with the outcome that they may have to take the aircraft out of service for a lengthy period to do so,
impacting the flight schedule and passengers. While there may be no management level pressure to maintain schedule at the
expense of aircraft serviceability, Flight Crews and Maintenance Engineers may be shouldering that pressure as implied
expectations, and end up taking it out on each other. Efforts by the organization to communicate and understand each other’s
roles and responsibilities, that Crews are required to write up defects in the journey logbook, and that Engineers are required
to assess and address aircraft defects free from operational pressures, may improve this working relationship.
Another working relationship which was observed was that between Flight Crews and Flight Dispatchers & Flight Operations
Coordinators who work within the Calm Air System Operations Coordination Centre (SOCC). Crew Questionnaire responses
revealed that Flight Crews were critical of Flight Dispatchers with respect to their expectations of Flight Dispatch. The Threat
section of this report details several instances of flight planning errors. Having said this, there were also instances where the
crew was surprised by their flight planned routing, though only detecting the issue once they received their clearance from
ATC, suggesting that the route was on their operational flight plan, but was not detected. This would suggest that a review of
briefing requirements/procedures/standards between Flight Crews and Flight Dispatchers may be beneficial, particularly when
so much information is available to both parties, and most communication is done electronically (email).
Finally, a single observation in the dataset which captured the outbound and return sectors of a charter flight could act as a
case study of weaknesses in non-standard trip preparation. Crews encountered issues with crew scheduling (reporting time),
lack of familiarity with the destination airport’s approaches and ATS hours of operation, were unclear about where to park and
deliver passengers at the airport, and were challenged when the flight was assigned an RNAV arrival procedure back into
Winnipeg and attempted to enter this information into the FMC. The narratives suggest that while Crews and Dispatchers
may be very comfortable with operating within the normal area of operations, higher levels of briefing, preparation and
awareness among all stakeholders would lead to better commercial and safety outcomes on these types of flights.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered as opportunities for improvement based on the analysis of LOSA data. They are
written intentionally broad in scope to allow for more thoughtful implementation within the organization.
1.

Establish a “Standards Committee” for each aircraft type. Creating small teams that represent the flight crews
operating that aircraft type will allow for more a formal evaluation and vetting process for amendments to SOPs and
training programs before they are published to line crews. A set meeting schedule over the course of the year would
allow for a more systematic and cyclical process for updating documents and incorporating feedback and
suggestions from pilots who operate the aircraft. This also creates an environment for better conceived policies and
procedures as well as improved buy-in on the flight line.

2.

Research the feasibility and implementation of a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. FOQA
(often also referred to as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)) uses de-identified digital flight data that is downloaded from
fleet aircraft to a database daily basis, and can be analyzed for trends and abnormal events. The program requires
technical and equipment investments in the aircraft fleet, data collection, storage and analysis tools along with a
formalized process with the pilot association for use. The value of the program is that it offers objective, aggregate
data about how aircraft are being flown, which can offer a predictive safety component to the organization’s safety
tools in addition to reactive and proactive safety processes.

3.

Review company stabilized approach criteria. Recent research on the reasons for pilots continuing unstable
approaches to a landing has offered insights into how organizations can establish stabilized approach criteria related
to their aircraft, operations and environment in an effort to mitigate risk. There were no go-arounds initiated in the 10
unstable approaches observed in the Calm Air LOSA. A review of company criteria may result in redefining risks
(resulting in fewer approaches categorized as unstable) and a more clear process for the PF/PNF to trigger a go
around when criteria is not met.

4.

Review guidance for completing visual approach briefings. While instrument approach briefing expectations are
quite clear and well-practiced by flight crews, a similarly clear expectation for visual approaches would lead to more
comprehensive understanding between pilots in the cockpit. Suggested briefing formats may come from some of
the pilots on the line who conduct these already as a personal ‘best practice’.

5.

Consider the syllabus and content of a “Captain Upgrade” course. An ‘Upgrade’ or ‘Command’ course can offer
a more formalized introduction to organizational systems and expectations that Captains interact with. Traditionally,
this familiarization has been accomplished through line indoctrination alone. Captains who are required to make
decisions on behalf of the organization while out in the field deserve to have the best understanding about the
reasoning behind policies and procedures and how operational functions (i.e.; Flight Dispatch, Flight Operations
Coordination) and commercial efforts (i.e.; cargo) integrate into daily operations. A more formalized process of the
above could help equip line Captains to be leaders by example at the highest levels.

6.

Explore the capability to standardize ATR fleet cockpit layout to the greatest extent possible. Because each
aircraft in the fleet did not come to Calm Air directly from the manufacturer, most aircraft have minor variations to
the arrangement and layout of equipment in the center pedestal due to service with previous operators. There are
multiple arrangements of radio heads, FMCs, weather radar controls, etc which makes familiarity difficult, particularly
in low light or in abnormal/emergency conditions. It is recognized that in certain cases, re-arrangement may not be
practical or possible, however there may be an opportunity to re-arrange and standardize to a more common layout
over time. This should be explored for feasibility.

7.

Expedite the authorization of RNAV approach procedures and training for ATR aircraft. The value of this effort
from an operational and a safety perspective cannot be over emphasized, and there is little argument from any
stakeholder to that effect.

8.

Identify efforts to improve the working relationship with Maintenance Engineers. There are numerous factors
which can affect this relationship, such as opportunities for face-to-face contact, understanding of the other person’s
roles, responsibilities and priorities, and certainly personality. A recognition of the points where Pilots and Engineers
come in to contact is important. Opportunities for joint training or ‘exchange’ visits (see Captain Upgrade course
above) could be opportunities to accomplish this.

9.

Review processes involved for ad-hoc charter planning. There is an opportunity to formalize the planning and
execution of non-standard flights which operate outside of the normal area of company operations. These should
extend beyond charter flights and also apply to freighter and position flights. Recognition of the ways in which these
flights are different – airspace, geography, weather, performance, communications, flight watch, ground support are
key to assessing and mitigating risks to safety and compromises to customer expectations.
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